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In the Supreme Court
Of the State of Utah
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA J.
JOHANSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.

vs.

6302

CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION OF RESPONDENT FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
The Cudahy Packing Company, respondent in the
above entitled cause, hereby respectfully petitions this
Court to rehear and reconsider the questions of law
involved in the case at bar for the r.easons hereinafter
stated. In making such petition attention is called to
the fact that by statute it is made the duty of the Court
that whenever a cause is remanded for a new trial in
the District Court, this Court shall pass upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented
upon appeal and necessary to a final determination of
the case. (Section 104-41-23, R. S. U., 1933.)
Although four written opinions were delivered by
the justices of this court on this appeal, it is believed
by the counsel who presents this petition that it cannot
as yet be determined with certainty whether the insurance
carrier shall be limited in its recovery, if recovery is
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allowed, to the amount which it actually paid to the
dependents of the deceased servant, or whether it shall
be permitted to recover, if recovery is allowed, damages
in excess of the compensation awarded and paid to the
dependents.
In seeking the reconsideration applied for the
respondent contends:
1. That the subrogation of the insurance carrier
provided for in Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, takes place by operation of law, and is not
dependent on contract or privity. It is not an assignment
nor is it synonymous therewith, and therefore the statute
conferring the right of subrogation upon the b.surance
carrier did not make the cause assignable to the insurance
carrier; nor did it open the door to general assignability.
(71 Utah 112.) (138 U. S. 595.)

2. The right of the insurance carrier to recover
damages from the tort-feasor, a stranger to the employment, created by Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes ·of
Utah, 1933, cannot be classified as a right of property
capable of inheritance. Rather it is one strictly personal
in its nature, the existence of which will not survive either
the death of the wrongdoer or the death of its owner.
This right of action to which the self-insuring master
or the insurance carrier of that master is by statute
subrogated cannot survive for or against the estates
of deceased persons under any provision that can be
found in Utah's Survival Statutes, Sections 102-11-5,
102-11-6 and 102-11-7.
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It is not an action for the ''recovery of any property,
real or personal," nor is it an action for "wasting·,
destroying, taking or converting the g·oods of another
person,'' nor is it an ''action founded upon contract.''
(263 Pac. 78.) The wrong of the tort-feasor, if wrong
there was, was delictual in character. It was a violation
on his part of some duty imposed upon him by law, not by
contract. The right to recover for such wrong never
has been assignable in this state except for the period
intervening between July 1, 1921, and June 26, 1933,
on which last named date the legislature expressly repealed the provision making causes of action for either
injury or death assignable. (See amendment-1939.)
3. Assuming for the purpose of argument the subrogation of the insurance carrier to a property right
(one capable of inheritance) to recover from the tortfeasor, a stranger to the employment, the amount of the
compensation award made and paid by the insurance
carrier, then the right claimed in the complaint in this
particular case is not that property right. The right
claimed by the plaintiffs in this case is the right which
the dependents of Johanson might have had to sue for
wrongful death if such dependents had not applied for
and been awarded compensation. Plaintiffs cannot
change their theory on appeal, and when the plaintiffs
cannot and have not, this Court is without power to
change such theory. A decision authorizing insurance
carrier to recover on the theory that it has a property
right for reimbursement of amount paid by it is in
direct antagonism to the theory of the complaint in the
case at bar.
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4. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the
statute provides for the subrogation of the insurance
carrier to a property right, i. e. one capable of inheritance,
then that subrogation by the very terms of the statute
is not complete, and for that reason not actionable until
the insurance carrier has paid in full the amount of the
compensation award. Until the subrogation of the insurance carrier is complete, until its title to the so-called
''property right'' vests, no valid assignment of such
right can be made. "It is contrary to rational thought
to say that a suit can be maintained upon the assignment
of a nonexistent thing." ( 275 Fed. 333.)
5. Because it affirmatively appears of record that
the Trial Court, upon sustaining the demurrer of the
defendant, allowed plaintiffs ten days within which to
amend their complaint, and the plaintiffs by their attorneys in open court declined this right to amend and
refused to plead further and elected to stand upon the
complaint of the plaintiffs, and because that complaint
was ''insufficient as against a general demurrer,"
(quoting Mr. Justice Pratt), then the Trial Court committed no error in entering judgment for the defendant;
and because no error was assigned by the appellants, or
could have been assigned, (that the Trial Court erred
in not allowing the plaintiffs to amend), then this Court
has no power on appeal to reverse the judgment of the
Trial Court on that ground. Errors not assigned cannol
be reviewed. Errors not made by the court and therefore
not assigned by appellants cannot be reviewed. When
a demurrer to a complaint is sustained and the com-
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plainant declines to amend, the Trial Court cannot do
otherwise than render judgment for the defendant. If
the ruling of the Trial Court is right, even though the
reasons giYen for that ruling are wrong, the judgment
must be affirmed. ''This Court can help only one who
helps himself." (164 Pac. 1052.) The plaintiffs have
never yet withdrawn their refusal to amend. The actual
facts as shown by the award of compensation made by
the Industrial Commission on August 22, 1938, make it
apparent that the award of compensation has not been
paid and cannot be paid until June 3, 1944.
6. The order of this Court allowing costs to appellants is against law. It is obviously a mistake by the
Court. On what theory can costs of appeal be allowed
against the respondent? The mistake, if mistake there
was, was that of the appellants, but there was no mistake.
The appellants filed the complaint they intended to file
and alleged therein what they intended to allege. Under
existing facts they could not allege payment of award.
In the brief that follows, the respondent will argue
and undertake to support by authorities each of the
foregoing propositions.
MARLON E. WILSON,
ROBERT C. WILSON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
And now comes Mahlon E. Wilson and hereby certifies that he is the attorney for the defendant in the
above entitled cause; that he has prepared the foregoing
petition for rehearing and its supporting brief; and he
further certifies that in his opinion there is good reason
to believe that the judgment and decision made by this
Court and objected to by the respondent herein is erroneous, and that the cause ought to be re-examined
and reconsidered by this Court.

MARLON E. WILSON
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BRIEF AND ARGUMENT
FOREWORD
The rule of the Common law to the effect that in
a civil court the death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury may be anomalous to a scientific
jurist, but it is explicable on historical grounds. rrhis
statement has been obtained from the opinion rendered
by Lord Parker in the case of Admiralty Commissioners
vs. Steamship America, A. C. 38, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 877
(1917). Referring to an early criticism made by Lord
Bramwell, Lord Parker said:
"It was, he considered, anomalous that a
master should be entitled to recover for loss of
service if his servant were wrongfully injured, but
should be without any remedy if his servant were
wrongfully killed. If it were any part of the
functions of this House to consider what rules
ought to prevail in a logical and scientific systern
of jurisprudence, much might no doubt be said
for this criticism; though it is not, in my opinion,
by any means clear that the anomaly does not in
reality consist rather in granting the remedy in
the former case than in refusing it in the latter.
In a society based so largely as our own is at the
present day upon contractual obligations, it does
not appear why the wrongful injury of A, whereby he is prevented from fullfilling his contractual
obligations to B, should confer on B a right of
action only where these obligations are those arising out of the relationship of master and servant,
or, indeed, why the right should not be extended
so as to cover all loss, whether arising out of
inability to perform a contract or otherwise.''
(Ann. Cas. 1917B, 878.)
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Lord Sumner also rendered an opinion in deciding
the case above cited. In the course of that opinion he
among other things said:
''Mr. Solicitor urged that such a principle is
highly technical and that, if a minor hurt to a
servant gives a cause of action to a master, a
fortiori must the major hurt which results fatally,
and he reminded your Lordships that this House
in the case of Mills vs. Armstrong (1888) 13 App.
Cas. (Eng.) 1, overruled Thorogood vs. Bryan
(1849) 8 C. B. 115, 65 E. C. L. 114, a case of long
standing, and exhorted your Lordships to take
heart and do likewise. This is hardly the right
view to take of your Lordships' judicial functions
nowadays, nor does it follow in the case of a legal
system such as ours, that a principle can be said
to be truly a part of the law merely because it
would be a more perfect expression of imperfect
rules, which, though imperfect, are well established
and well defined. Again, an established rule does
not beccome questionable merely because different
conjectural justifications of it have been offered,
or because none is forthcoming that is not
fanciful.'' (Ann. Cas. 1917B; · 884.)
And again on Page 885 he said :
'' There never was an action to recover
damages for the death of a human being in the
sense now contended for, and the remedy by
appeal which so long persisted in the case of the
widow, the most crying case of all, was one which
the most hardened formalist would not have
tolerated, had any such action at law been possible,
for it was long a form of legalized blackmail.
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The historical explanation of the absence of
such an action at the suit of relatives applies
equally to the case of a master's claim for the
death of a member of his familia, for example,
a servant. It is equally incapable of judicial
creation. Indeed, what is anomalous about the
action per quod servitium amisit is not that it
does not extend to the loss of service in the event
of the servant being killed, but that it should exist
at all. It appears to be a survival from the time
·
when service was a ~tatus.''
Referring to the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona, Lord Sumner said:
"If, however, this maxim is put aside, since
in the present case it is irrelevant, I think that
the argument that your Lordships should discover
under this ancient form of action some principle
hitherto undetected is really an appeal to this
House in its legislative and not in its judicial
capacity.''
The facts of the case just cited may be stated as
follows: It was conceded that in the year 1912 the Steamship America collided with a submarine belonging to
the English government ; that the America was · alone
to blame for the collision. As a result of that collision
the submarine was lost, and except for one officer,
all of its crew, consisting of an officer and fifteen sailors
of the Royal Navy, were drowned. Among the items
of damage claimed by th~ United Kingdom was a sum
of 5140 English Pounds, or approximately $25,000, representing the capitalized amount of pensions and grants
payable to the relatives of the men who were drowned.
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These pensions and allowances were granted under statutory authority according to authorized scales. The
question involved was the right of the English government to obtain indemnity from the owners of the offending steamship for the amount of pensions which, pursuant to act of Parliament, England was compelled to
pay to the relatives of the sixteen men who were drowned
by reason of the conceded negligent act.
It was held:
''that a person who negligently caused the sinking
of a naval vessel, and the death of the sailors
thereon, was liable to the Crown for the value
of the vessel but not for the value of the pensions
paid by the Crown to the dependents of the
deceased.'' (Ann. Cas. 1917B, 887.)
The decision of the House of Lords, rendered December 19, 1916, denying liability, compels the admiration
of every man who believes in the principles of constitutional government as contradistinguished from arbitrary
and capricious action. The attitude of these English
jurists, as particularly expressed by Lord Sumner when
he distinguishes between the legislative and judicial
capacity of the House of Lords, has been the bulwark
of the judicial systems of England and America. Neither
England nor America as such can long survive if that
bulwark is destroyed.
In America the courts have no legislative capacity,
and whenever an American judge exercises such a capacity he usurps a power that he does not possess.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
This Eng·lish case has been quoted from in this
foreword to this brief for the purpose of emphasizing
the duty of the bar as well as the bench. The disposition
to legislate is constant, but it should be resisted and
destroyed. A study of the case must yield benefit to
the mind of eYery person who is interested in the history
of the law controlling the relation of master and servant,
which \Yas in the beginning· one of status but has now
become one of contract.
At common law the master was entitled to recover
for a loss of service if his servant was wrongfully injured, but that master was without remedy if his servant
was wrongfully killed. The remedy for the injury did not
survive the death of either the wrongdoer or the master,
and therefore it was not assignable. No question could
arise relative to the survivability or assignability of the
master's claim for the death of his servant because the
master had no claim.
Whether the law should provide that any person
sustaining pecuniary loss by reason of the wrongful
death of another person should have a right of recovery
against the wrongdoer is a legislative and not a judicial
problem. The enactment of such a law would result in
consequences tremendous in their character. It is submitted, however, that no greater reason can exist for
a recovery from a wrongdoer by an insurance carrier
of the amount that it has been required to pay to satisfy
an award of compensation for the death of a servant
than for a recovery from a wrongdoer by a life insurance
company of the amount that it has been required to pay
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to satisfy a claim for the death of the insured. The death
is the principal event in both cases. To assert that it is
a mere incident in either is a denial of that which is
obvious. Both contracts of insurance are indemnifying
in their natures. The liability insurance company pays
a loss sustained by the dependents of the deceased servant, the amount of which is determined by applying the
standards prescribed by the Compensation Act. The life
insurance company pays an amount fixed by agreement
at the time the contract of insurance is made. There
is no reason why the amount of the loss cannot be agreed
upon in advance of injury as well as thereafter. In
ordinary life insurance the insurer and insured in effect
fix the value of the insured's life in the contract and
at the time of the contract. The amounts of premium
paid are dependent upon the fixed value of the life of the
insured.
Neither of these contracts is of a wagering character
unless they are for the benefit of persons who have no
insurable interest in the life of the insured; unless .they
are for the benefit of persons who have a greater interest
in the death of the insured than in a continuance of his
life. Such contracts are void ab initio.
If the death of the insured, employed or unemployed,
is caused by the act of a third person, i. e. a stranger to
the contract of employment or to the contract of insurance, then the act is wrongful only if the person who
commits it violates some civil duty imposed upon him,
not by contract, but by law. The wrongful act may constitute murder and yet it cannot create a civil cause of
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action unless a eiYil remedy in favor of some person has
been created by statute. In the absence of such statute
no one has a civil cause of action.
A judicial controversy or even a private quarrel
cannot exist without at least two adversaries. A contract
requires two parties. A cause of action requires a plaintiff who has a civil remedy, and when he has, a right
exists. There must be a violation of that right by the
defendant. The idea that a tort can be committed by
one without legally injuring another is a real absurdity.
Blind men cannot see; oceans do not burn, and causes
of action cannot exist in~ependent and apart from some
person possessed of a remedy for the enforcement of
such causes.
The established rule is that no one can exercise a
statutory remedy unless he comes within the statute. The
English Crown in the case cited was not a beneficiary
in Lord Campbell's Act, and as a result the English
Crown had no cause of action.
The insurance plaintiff in the Brame case was not
within the Louisiana death statute, and as a result the
insurance company stated no cause of action. (95 U. S.
754; 24 L. Ed. 580.)
The heirs of Charles Thorpe, deceased, were not
within the Wyoming statute, and as a result their complaint stated no cause of action. (24 Utah, 476; 68 Pac.
145.)
The Brame case well illustrates the point. The insurance company, as plaintiff, alleged that Brame had fel-
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oniously killed McLemore; that McLemore's death had
caused a pecuniary loss of $7000 to the insurance company. It was plainly alleged that Brame had done wrong;
that he had committed murder, but his violation of law
did not create cause of action in favor of the plaintiff
insurance company, because the plaintiff was not given
any remedy in the death statute and had no remedy at
common law. McLemore in his lifetime could have made
contracts without number. His death would have pre, vented performance and caused great pecuniary loss, but
a tort-feasor who kills another incurs no liability to persons contracting with or employed by the deceased unless the wrongful act is done to another with malicious
intent to injure him by destroying his contract relation.
(Nothing of the kind involved here.)
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. N. Y. N.
H. & Hartford R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 293; 65 Am. Dec.
571 (1856).
No one can successfully dispute the power of a state
legislature to enact a law which would change these rules
and make liable defendants who had acted as Brame was
charged to have acted, but the liability of the defendant, if imposed by statute, could not be otherwise than
delictual in character. Such a statute would not change
that in the slightest particular. The statute would provide a remedy to an insurance company and a consequent right. The measure of damages would be fixed at
the amount of the insurance paid. Availing itself of such
a statute, the insurance company would be enforcing its
own cause of action. That cause of action would not be
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based on a property right, i. e. one capable of inheritance.
\Yhy, if not because of the character of the wrong done
by a Brame 1 The wrongful act would be a personal
tort. The natural death, or even the suicide, of either
the plaintiff or the defendant would destroy the existence of that right. (Of course the statute could change
the rule as to survivability.) The remedy would not be
aYailable for litigation against the estate of the defendant in the absence of statute.
In order to find a property right it is necessary that
the remedy for its enforcement shall pass to the estate
of the person injured, and that the liability of the wrongdoer shall at his death become a liability of his estate.
\Yhenever that which was a personal right is made assignable by statute without qualification, then, of course, such
right becomes property, capable of inheritance; but when
its assignability is limited to a particular person as assignee, then the thing assigned is still personal.
Bates vs. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493; 104 S. W. 73;
120 Am. St. 761 (1907). See this case.)
These observations are made to be used as general
principles in a consideration of the discussion of the
specific points made in the petition for rehearing. The
contentions are six innumber, Contentions 1, 2, 3 and 4
involve the meaning of Utah's Compensation Act, particularly Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
Robert Johanson, the deceased, met his death on June 3,
1938. On that date Section 42-1-58 read as follows:
"42-1-58.
Id.
WRONGFUL ACT OF
THIRD PERSONS-SUBROGATION. When
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any injury for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act of a third person, the injured employee, or
in case of death his dependents, may at their option claim compensation under this title or have
their action for damages against such third person; and, if compensation is claimed and awarded,
the employer or insurance carrier having paid the
compensation shall be subrogated to the rights of
such employee or his dependents to recover against
such third person ; provided, if such recovery shall
be in excess of the amount of the compensation
awarded and paid, then such excess, less the reasonable expenses of the action, shall be paid to the
employee or his dependents. (L. 21, p. 165, Sec.
3133.)

CONTENTION NO. 1
THE SUBROGATION OF THE INSURANCE CARRIER BY THE STATUTE WAS NOT ASSIGNMENT
It has been held in this case in the opinion written
by Mr. Justice Pratt and concurred in by Chief Justice
Moffat, "that the cause of action under Section 42-1-58
in favor of the insurance carrier may be assigned.'' This
decision is based upon the ground that the cause of action is considered ''in the nature of a property right,''
"one which should survive to the successor of the insurance carrier the same as any other cause in the nature of a property right.''
In a separate opinion concurring in the result, Mr.
Justice Wolfe held that because Section 42-1-58 subrogated the employer or insurance carrier which paid the
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compensation to the rights of the injured employee or his
dependents in case of death, to recover against the third
person, the cause of action had been made assignable by
that section of the statute; that such statute, having made
an ex delicto action assignabl~ to the party paying the
compensation, had the legal effect of opening the door
completely to general assignability. (In other words
a license granted to one, is a license to all.)
:Mr. Justice Larson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, held that the right to recover damages to
which the insurance carrier had been subrogated was not
assignable.
~Ir.

Justice J\IcDonough dissenting, held that such
right was not assignable.
Two of the justices held .that the judgment of the
District Court should be affirmed ; two of the justices
held that ''the complaint was insufficient as against a
general demurrer since it does not contain an allegation
that the insurance carrier has paid the award.'' The
other justice in effect held that the payment of the
award by the insurance carrier was a ''condition precedent" to obtaining title to the cause of action; that
such cause of action or cause for the action is the negligent killing of the employee.
The right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action
cannot be sustained if the cause of action for which recovery is sought was not assignable. Assignability of a
cause of action presupposses the existence of the subject of the assignment at the time such assignment was
made. A want of assignability may exist (a) because of
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the general nature of the action, or (b) because of the
non-existence of any cause of action. If the insurance
carrier did not have vested in it a cause of action at the
time of the assignment, then, of course, the assignment
relied upon in the complaint cannot be otherwise than a
nullity.
By Section 42-1-58 above quoted it is in effect provided that if the death of a servant protected by theWorkmen 's Compensation Act is caused by the wrongful act
of some stranger to the employment, the dependants of
that servant are given by the statute one of two alternative remedies, and consequently one of two alternative
rights. To obtain the first remedy, viz.: that of compensation, was the chief purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It consists in the dependents applying for
and having awarded to them compensation as against
the master for whom the servant was working at the
time of his injury which resulted in death. By providing
this remedy, then the legislature under the Constitution,
Article XVI, Sec. 5, as amended in 1920, had the power to abrogate entirely the right to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death.
Halling vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah, 112;
263 Pac. 78 (1927).
But the legislature, within its lawful power, gave
the dependents of the deceased servant the right to elect
and take a second remedy. If these dependents did not
elect to take the first remedy and pursue it to the point
of obtaining an award of compensation against the
master, then the statute provided this second remedy,
viz: these dependents might have their action for damag-
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es against the stranger who wrongfully caused the death
of the servant.
These two remedies are disjunctive-not conjunctive.
They are alternatiYe. If the dependents elect to take
compensation and obtain an award, as it is alleged they
did in the case at bar, then they never becatne vested
1vith or acquired any right to have an action for dwnapes
apainst the stranger who wrongfully caused the death
of the servant. The dependents became vested with the
right of choosing one of two remedies, but until the
choice was made no right to either existed or was vested.
\\lien the dependents claimed and were awarded compensation, then they had no further interest in the
matter except to recover their compensation either in a
lump, if so awarded, or in periodic payments, if so
awarded. The right to recover the damages sustained
by them because of the death of the servant against the
third person never became their right because they
claimed and had awarded to them the compensation
provided for by the Act. The taking of compensation,
which was certain and inexpensive to obtain, precluded
the taking of the right to recover damages from the
third person.
In the case at bar it is alleged in the complaint that
the dependents voluntarily applied for and obtained an
award against the master. The risk of that master was
carried by the London Guarantee & Accident Company,
Ltd., hereinafter called the insurance carrier. The
statutes provides:
''if compensation is claimed and awarded, the
employer or insurance carrier having paid the
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compensation shall be subrogated to the rights
of such employee or his dependents to recover
against such third person." (It then has a provision relative to the distribution of the amount
of recovery, if any, the effect of which will bll
hereafter explained.)
The right to recover damages which the dependents
might have taken but did not take 4id not become existent as a cause of action until the insurance carrier paid
the full amount of the compensation award. Between
the time of the award of compensation and the payment
of that award by the insurance carrier, it was a pure
fiction. In view of the fact that the dependents were
compelled to elect as between compensation from the
master or damages from the stranger whose wrongful
act had caused the death of the servant, and that such
dependents were not allowed to have both of these remedies, or, rather, were allowed to have only one of such
remedies, it can be said with absolute accuracy that the
J ohansons in this case never became possessed with any
right to recover damages against the stranger or third.
person. It would be an absurdity to assert that because
the dependents declined the remedy of recovery against
the third person, therefore the insurance carrier was
made an assignee of a non-existent right.
Some effect must be given to the provision under
consideration, and therefore it should be read:: ''The
insurance carrier having paid the compensation, shall
be subrogated to whatever rights the dependents would
have had to recover against such third person if such
dependents had not applied for and had not claimed and
obtained an award of compensation." These and these
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only are the rights of the insurance carrier as they are
provided in this statute. At the time of the death of the
servant they came into existence as available remedies
resulting in inchoate rights. The dependents, if they
so elected, could have such rights in themselves, but if
such dependents claimed and obtained an award of
compensation against the master, then the rights to
recover damages against the third person never vested
and could not vest in the dependents. If the award of
compensation was made in favor of the dependents and
against the master, the latter's insurance carrier could
have the rights to recover damages from the third person
vest in that carrier only by paying in full the amount of
compensation awarded in favor of the dependents and
against the master.
What is Subrogation? It has been defined as the
substitution of another person in the place of the creditor
to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the debt. The
facts in the case at bar do not fit into this definition
except by applying the terms of the statute. Subrogation is a legal fiction by a force of which an obligation
extinguished by payment made by a third person is
considered as continuing to subsist for the benefit of
that person who paid the obligation.
Now, what is the obligation to be paid, applying
Section 42-1-58~ The award of compensation in this
case is $31.16 every four weeks for a period of six years
from June 4, 1938.
The Award: It is like unto a judgment payable in
periodic future installments, payment to cease on a fixed
date. (e. g. judgment for alimony.) It is actually (no
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fiction here) subsisting as a right of dependents and as
an obligation of the insurance carrier, which obligation
arises out of the contract of insurance with master. If
all of the dependents should die, with all sums due at
the date of death fully paid, but with installments still
unpaid because not yet due, would the right to such installments be the subject of inheritance by the heirs of
the dependents 1 (135 Am. St. 775.)
See also Hunt vs. Monroe, 32 Utah, 428; 91 Pac.
269 (1907).
(A decree for alimony or maintenance, payable in
the future in periodic installments, is not a judicial debt
of record.)
To What is the Insurance Company Subrogated?
The right to recover damages from the wrongdoer is
still a "bird in the bush"-not a "bird in hand." (This
figure is used in 135 Am. St. 775.) It is considered
as subsisting as a right to the dependents to recover
damages from the tort-feasor for the negligent killing
of the servant. This consideration of such right is
fictional because the dependents never possessed that
right. When the award is made, this right is no longer
available for choice by the dependents, but when the
award is paid by the insurance carrier, then, and not
till then, the insurance carrier becomes vested with that
right to recover damages from the wrongdoer. That
right then becomes a "bird in hand" of the insurance
carrier. The award is actually gone. All rights of
dependents have been satisfied and discharged.
The fiction commences to function as to the award.
It is still considered as subsisting but only for the pur-
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poses (a) of giving a right to the insurance carrier to
recover a judgment for damages against the wrongdoer,
and (b) measuring the extent of the insurance carrier's
rights in the judgment when and if one is recovered by
the carrier against the wrongdoer. The action (call it
security or what not) against the wrongdoer is ex delicto
in character from the date of the accident until it is
merged into a judgment. It is for a tort and is a personal
right protected by the Constitution when once vested,
not amenable to execution or bankruptcy and not a subject
of inheritance.
The Judgment; Its Amount; Distribution of Its
Proceeds: The judgment is property. The proceeds
realized from the judgment are to be distributed, first
to reimburse the insurance carrier for the amount of
compensation awarded and paid. (If because of a death
of some of the dependents the carrier should be relieved
from paying the full amount of the award, or a part
of that award abated, then, of course, the extent of the
reimbursement would be reduced to the amount paid.
The extent of recovery from the wrongdoer by the insurance carrier would likewise be reduced.) The excess
remaining after reimbursement of carrier, less the reasonable expenses of the action, is then paid to the dependents. If either all of the dependents die or the
wrongdoer dies prior to judgment the action for damages
ceases to exist. (120 Am. St. 761.)

Too often in a consideration of these questions one
inclined to overlook the effect of the death of the
wrongdoer.
IS
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Brown vs. Wightman, 47 Utah 31; 151 Pac. 366;
L. R. A. 1916A, 1140 (1015).
Clark vs. Goodwin, Adm., 170 Cal. 327 ; 150 Pac. 357;
L. R. A. 1916A, 1142 ( 1915).
Each of these two cases involves the death of the
wrongdoer. (It is a fact that the author of the Utah
opinion collaborated with the author of the California
opinion before either of said opinions were rendered.)
The fact that the dependents of the deceased servant
may have paid to them an excess upon the distribution of
the proceeds of the judgment is not to be construed as
meaning that they have any interest in the action. On
the other hand, such excess so paid should not be considered as a gratuity from either the self-insuring master
or the insurance carrier or the wrongdoer. The selfinsuring master or the insurance carrier is reimbursed
to the extent of all sums paid out to satisfy the award
of compensation. In addition to these sums the master
or insurance carrier is allowed costs expended, counsel
fees and all reasonable expenses incurred and paid in
the prosecution of the action against the wrongdoer.
Any further sums, if received by either the master or
insurance carrier, would be profit from a source that
should not yield profit. Public policy would condemn the
taking of such profit.
Brown vs. Southern Ry., 204 N. C. 668; 169 S. E.
419 (1933).
In this North Carolina case the court held:
''When the employer seeks to recover the
amount paid by him from such third party his
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hands ought not to have the blood of the dead or
injured workman upon them when he thus invokes
the impartial powers and processes of the law.
It also said :
"If it be conceded that I was negligent, you
were also guilty of negligence. If I killed the
deceased, you participated actively in the killing.
Sound public policy, sanctioned and adopted by
the decisions of the Supreme Court, forbids you
to profit b:~ your own wrong to pluck good fruit
from the evil tree of your planting.''
\Vhat this North Carolina Court said relative to the
disputed question of the effect of the contributory negligence of the employer cannot occasion very much dispute
relative to the distribution of the proceeds of the judgment.

Take the other side of the problem. The wrongdoer
should not be required to pay any greater amount of
damage than that actually sustained by the dependents.
Their damage should be limited by the extent of the
dependency. It is not believed that the measure of
damages applicable to Section 104-3-11, where companionship is an element, can be the measure of damages
in an action prosecuted by the dependents under Section
42-1-58.
The right to compensation under the Compensation
Act is given to those who are actually dependent on the
deceased. That they were not legal heirs of the deceased
is of no consequence, but ''the statute was not designed
as a city of refuge for the negligent third party."
(Brown vs. Southern Ry., supra.) If that third party,
the tort-feasor, should not pay greater damages than
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those actually sustained, such tort-feasor should not
pay less than such amount ; otherwise, he will profit
by his wrong. He is not required to pay compensation
because he injured or killed a servant. His liability
rests on his fault. He should not get a benefit from the
Compensation Act unless he is brought under that Act.
(Some states have acts binding the third person as well
as the master.) The same public policy which condemns
profit by insurance carrier or master condemns profit
by a wrongdoer.
The excess remains, not necessarily in every caseperhaps not in this one; perhaps not in the case at bar,
because the compensation awarded was limited to approximately $2500. In some cases like the Parramore
case, one feature of which was presented by the writer
of this brief acting as counsel for the Cudahy Packing
Company, the damages, if any had been recovered, might
well have been $10,000 or more, whereas, the compensation which had been awarded by the Industrial Commission of this state was approximately $5250, because that
amount was the maximum that could under the law be
awarded by the Industrial Commission.
Justice does not permit the excess to be obtained
and kept by either the master or the insurance carrier,
nor does it permit that excess to be retained and kept
by the wrongdoer. By verdict and judgment the determination may be that the dependents of the deceased servant have sustained a loss because of the wrongful killing
in a sum equal not only to the compensation award but
greatly in excess thereof. To pay such excess, less
the reasonable expenses of the action, to the dependents
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does not constitute a gratuity unless doing justice is a
gratuity. By these means outlined in the statute the
dependents get only the amount of their loss. It is
submitted that they should not get less.
Why General Assignability Should not be Permitted:
These \Y orkmen 's Compensation Acts were designed
primarily for the protection of those who labor and
their dependents. To secure their protection and the
protection of the public in g·eneral there should not be
adopted e\en by a legislature, let alone by judicial construction, unless such construction is required, any system
that will encourage or promote a traffic in these rights
protected by this Act. If the door is opened ''completely
to general assignability,'' the compensation itself may
be used for purposes of speculation in the outcome of
personal injury suits. The law should never open its
doors to such an extent as to create opportunities for
fraud or legalized chicanery, and one of the evils that
caused the enactment of "\Vorkmen 's Compensation Acts
was the somewhat general belief that the prosecution
of the personal injury suit had become analogous to
what is called a ''racket. ''

By these observations the writer of this brief does
not intend to cast the slightest reflection upon the counsel who represent the plaintiffs in the case at bar, nor
does he intend to refer to any person in particular.
He has no knowledge of the contract between the instuance company and the plaintiffs in the case at bar.
He does submit, however, that before assignments are
permitted by any statute, such assignments should be
submitted to the Industrial Commission and allowed to
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function only with its approval. These observations are
made merely for the purpose of suggesting that there
still exist sound reasons for the rules of law that prohibit
assignability. Man has not yet attained unto Nirvana.

The Statutes Requires Full Payment of Compensation Award: Taking this language from one of the
opinions, ''allegations must be contained in the complaint
showing that the insurer has performed those conditions
precedent to obtaining title to the cause of action"
as absolutely sound, the conclusion must follow that
the insurance carrier must prove that it has fully paid
the award before the insurance carrier can become
veste<;l with the right to recover damages from the
wrongdoer. This right to recover damages is in the
language of the Ohio Court, used with reference to the
death action," a bird in the bush"; it is in an embryonic
and inchoate state, and that condition continues until
the insurance carrier has paid the amount of the compensation award.
The words "having paid the compensation" must
mean payment in full; otherwise such words mean '' obligated to pay" or "liable to pay," and mean nothing
so far as payment is concerned. (Many states have
statutes using the words "liable to pay.") If the words
''having paid the compensation'' mean nothing more
than ''liable to pay'' so far as payment is concerned,
then such words mean nothing. Such a construction
eliminates from the statute the words "having paid the
compensation.'' To strike them from the statute is a legislative function. To give them force suspends the "birth"
of the action in this case for a period of six years from
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the date of Johanson's death, June 3, 1938. To say that
these words mean ''payment on account,'' as one of the
opinions in this case seems to indicate, is only in a slight
degree less objectionable from a judicial standpoint than
to ignore the element of payment entirely.
''Payment is the extinguishment of the
claim.''
Binford vs. Adams, 104 Ind. 41; 3 N. E. 753 (1885).
''Prima facie the word 'paid' indicates that
the obligation has been satisfied and the demand
extinguished. ''
Lynds vs. Van V alkenburgh, 77 Kan. 24; 93 Pac. 615
(1908).
For anyone to assert, as the plaintiffs did in their
brief, that the compensation has been paid (appellants'
brief, P. 13.) is to ignore the complaint. Such an assertion is at war with the award of the Commission, a certified copy of which is hereto attached. Part payment is
not payment. To be liable for payment is one thing,
whereas, actual payment is another. In cases where the
periodic payments required by the award extend ouf
over a longer period, it is true that the "birth" of the
action is long delayed.
But, as was said by the lllinois Supreme Court, 308
Ill. 322; 138 N. E. 658, this dilemma, if one there is, is
one created by the legislature and ''the remedy lies with
the legislature. We do not see how we can give the
statute the construction contended for by appellant without resorting to legislation ourselves.''
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It is not unreasonable to believe that the Utah legislature was making an effort at a legislative recognition
of the principle of equitable subrogation, which generally
requires full payment before there can come about any
subrogation. (182 Cal. 140; 187 Pac. 735 (1920). In any
event, upon full payment, and not until then, the insurance carrier became vested with the right to recover
against the third person, the tort-feasor. How that
cause can be assignable before it comes into existence,
or how its assignment can accelerate its "birth" is not
susceptible of rational explanation. (275 Fed. 333.)
If ''it is payment of the award that gives birth
to the carrier's rights," then without the payment of
that award the carrier would have no rights either to
enforce or assign. If this is a suit to recover "property
-money-expenditure and not in tort," then indeed has
il discovery been made of a principle hitherto unknown,
except perhaps in the bayou of Louisiana.
Foster Co. Ltd. vs. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596;
93 So. 913 (1922).
''An employer upon paying compensation for
injuries to an employe sustained through the fault
and negligence of a third person has two causes
of action, one by way of subrogation and on behalf
of the employe under Workmen's Compensation
Law, Sec. 7, and the other for indemnification
as on implied or quasi contract for reimbursement for the money it was compelled to pay on
account of the third person's fault." (Par. 2
syllabi.)
It was also held that the cause of action for indemnification was contractual in character and existed inde-
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pendent of statute. It turned out in this Foster case
that the action for the reimbursement of the money paid
because of the fault of the defendant was not barred by
the Louisiana statute of limitations, but in and so far as
the demand exceeded the sum alleged to have been paid
by plaintiffs, it was barred by the statute of limitations.
This case leads to the inquiry relative to the common
counts as they existed at common law and as they are
still used in many states, including Utah. There were
four at common law, all growing out of the action of
assumpsit. That which came to be called, "indebitatus
assumpsit'' absorbed quantum meruit and quantum
Yalebat, leaving only what is called our action on an
account stated remaining. To maintain assumpsit it is
necessary that there should be a contract, either express
or implied. There is special assumpsit and there is
general assumpsit. To state a case in special assumpsit
one of the prime essentials is a promise made by the
defenda~ In general assumpsit, in the early part of
the si&teerith century it was held that a promise to pay
might be inferred from the fact that the defendant had
been enriched or benefited. This kind of assumpsit was
nothing more or less than the old action of debt which
had existed for centuries prior to the Statute of Westminster, 1285. It was the emolument of one party at the
expense of the other, and from this emolument the law
implied a promise, and this promise was nothing but
a remedial fiction.
Keigwin Cases Common Law Pleading, P. 190.
Now the question has been decided time and again
about waiving a tort and suing in assumpsit. If A
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should take B 's automobile and sell it, B could waiv~
the conversion and sue for money had and received an(
recover the price which the wrongdoer obtained for thE
automobile. This upon the theory that A had been un·
justly enriched to the extent of the amount of money tha1
he received for the automobile which he originally converted. If A received money from B the law would
imply a promise on his part to repay the money s<J
received because he was unjustly enriched. If he received
goods and chattels from B, he was unjustly enriched to
the extent of their value. If at his request B paid out
money on his account, he was unjustly enriched to the
extent of the money paid out, but it is not the law that
a right of action in contract can be created by waiving
a tort, such as negligent injury or killing of a servant.
''You cannot obtain an implied promise from a duty to
pay damages.'' The implied or fictional promise comes
only from unjust enrichment of the defendant.
Bigby vs. United States, 188 U. S. 400; 47 L. Ed.
519 (1903).
Bigby brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover
damages sustained by him from the negligent management of an elevator in a public building. The Court of
Claims had jurisdiction of claims founded upon contract,
express or implied, with the government, or for damages ''in cases not sounding in tort.'' To make his case one
of contract the plaintiff alleged that he had entered the
elevator at the request of the government's agent ana
that thereupon the defendant entered into an implied
contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, it agreed
to manage the elevator with due care and to carry the
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plaintiff safely. On demurrer to the petition it was held
that it did not state a case within the jurisdiction of the
Court, but one essentially in tort.
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for a unanimous court,
said among other things :
''Causing harm by negligence is a tort. One
of the definitions of a tort is an act or omission
causing harm which the person so acting or omitting did not intend to cause, but might and should
with due diligence have foreseen and prevented.''
Pollock on Torts, 1, 19.
And again he said:
''It is a case sounding in tort because it had
its origin in and is founded on the wrongful and
negligent act of the elevator manager. There is
in it no element of contract as between the
plaintiff and the government.''
Justice Harlan quoted from the case of Cooper vs.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370; 17 N. E. 892, 894 (1888). In
this Cooper case a man falsely pretending that he was
unmarried, induced the plaintiff to marry him and live
with him as his wife. After this man's death the plaintiff
discovered that at the time of his pretended marriage to
her he had a wife still living and not divorced. She
sued Cooper's estate to recover for services as his
housekeeper.
The Massachusetts Court said:
"The obligation to make recompense for the
injury done by the tort was imposed by law and
could be enforced only in an action of tort. It
was not a debt or duty upon which the law raised
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a promise which would support an action of
contract.''
The Louisiana case, holding that as to the compensation paid by the employer that party had a cause of action
upon an implied contract, independent of statute, for
indemnification at the hands of the defendant if the
injury was caused by the latter's negligence, cannot have
any foundation as law in any other state except possibly
Louisiana. The publication of such an opinion by any
court carries its own punishment.
If the Court could lawfully imply a promise on the
part of the wrongdoer to reimburse the master or the
insurance carrier for money paid out to the servant, or
his dependents in case of death, to satisfy the award of
compensation, then with greater reason could a promise
be implied on the part of the wrongdoer to pay the amount
of loss which the servant or his dependents sustained
by reason of the tort. It may be said that neither the
injured servant nor his dependents in case of death had
any express agreement with the tort-feasor, but neither
did the insurance carrier or the master have any agreement with the tort-feasor. Servants or their surviving
dependents ought to be entitled to an equal protection
along with masters and insurance carriers, and then
why should this protection be confined to servants, dependents, masters or insurance carriers' Having opened
the door to fiction on the theory of unjust enrichment
(Slade's Case, 1602), why not open it completely to a
general fiction' Why not substitute ''unjust loss'' for
''unjust enrichment''' Why not imply a promise to
pay damages resulting from tort as against every tort-
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feasor! Under such an extension of the doctrine of
implied promise, contracts will no longer rest upon agreement or consent except as every person impliedly agrees
not to violate the duties or obligations imposed upon him
by law. ''Let us take heart'' and open the door completely to the theory of social contract.

It is Fundamental Law that subrogation cannot take
place until the payment of the whole debt or obligation.
Columbia Finance & Trust Co. vs. Railway Co.,
60 Fed. 794 (6 C. C. A.; 1894).
In the course of his opinion Circuit Judge Lurton
said:
''The equity of subrogation does not arise
from the mere obligation to pay. It springs alone
from payment. The liability of the surety for the
remainder of the debt continued as well after as
before such payment, and until the entire debt
is paid the surety has no such equity as will
entitle him to the aid of a court of equity.''
(Italics inserted.)
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. vs. Centrapolis Bank, 17 Fed. (2d) 913; 53 A. L. R. 295
(1927).
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. vs. Union
Bank & Trust Co., 228 Fed. 448 ( 6 C. C. A. ;
1915).
A reading of these cases will make clear that there
is a real subrogation and what is sometimes called a
"conventional" subrogation, i. e. a right resting upon
contract.
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Bingham vs. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 Utah, 149;
283 Pac. 1055 (1930).
In this case this Court made a clear distinction
between legal subrogation, which is not the direct result
of an agreement, and conventional subrogation, which
depends upon a contract. This Court said :
''Where the person who pays the debt of
another stands in the situation of a surety, or is
compelled to pay to protect his own right or
property, the right of subrogation is a consequence which equity attaches to such a condition,
and the right of subrogation under such circumstances is not a direct result of an agreement.
This, in law, is termed 'legal subrogation.' In
addition to the principle of legal subrogation,
there exists another principle termed 'conventional subrogation,' which occurs where the one
who is under no obligation to make the payment,
and who has no right or interest to protect, pays
the debt of another under an agreement, express
or implied, that he will be subrogated to rights
of the debtor or creditor.''
And again:
''Conventional subrogation depends upon a
contract.''
If subrogation is brought about directly through a
contract or agreement, then it is an assignment, and the
manner in which the assignee shall act is controlled by
the terms of the agreement. If, however, there is a real
subrogation, i. e. one independent of contract, then it is
the payment of the obligation, or, as Mr. Justice Pratt
says in his opinion, "it is the payment of the award that
gives birth to the carrier's rights.''
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Why! Until the insurance carrier has paid out something it has suffered no loss and acquired no right or
equity. If it has paid only a part and not all, then to
allow it an action for the part paid violates the principle
forbidding the splitting of causes of action. If the insurance carrier has paid only in part and is allowed to
recover all, then the Salt Company in this case carrying
the primary liability for master's compensation might
have a right to complain, or perhaps the dependents of
the deceased servant might be injured. If this action
is generally assignable the insurance carrier then may
sell it to persons even beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts of Utah. General assignment and reassignment
may ultimately nullify the fundamental purposes of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 217 N.Y. S. 277.

The insurance carrier ''having paid the compensat,ion" becomes a subrogee and not an assignee.
City of New Orleans vs. Whitney, 138 U. S. 595;
34 L. Ed. 1102 (1890).
In this case Mr. Justice Bradley, rendering the opinion of the court, said :
''Subrogation is not assignment'. The most
that can be said is that the subrogated creditor by
operation of law represents the person to whose
right he is subrogated.''
Orange Ice, Light & Water Co. vs. Texas Compensation Ins. Co., 278 Fed. 8 ( 5 C. C. A. ; 1922).
The Texas Compensation Insurance Company a
corporation and therefore a citizen of Delaware, brought
suit against the Orange Ice, Light & Power Company
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and Yellow Pine Paper Mill Company, each a citizen of
Texas, as defendants, to recover for injuries inflicted
on Jesse L. Dowdell and for his death resulting therefrom under the provisions of the Texas Workmen's
Compensation law. The section of the Texas statute
was similar to Section 42-1-58 of the U~ah statute. In
some respects, however, it was essentially different. The
servant, after injury and before his death, elected to
receive compensation. After his death the servant's
widow claimed compensation. The cause of action of
the servant for pain and suffering endured by him prior
to his death survived to the widow, and then she had a
new and independent cause of action for death by virtue
of the death statute of Texas. Under the Texas Compensation statute the insurance carrier, by paying the amount
of compensation, became subrogated to the rights of the
servant and the rights of the servant's widow. The
insurance carrier filed a petition seeking to recover
$10,000 for the pain and suffering endured by the injured
man and $40,000 for and on account of his death. The
trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $5000 for
the pain and suffering and $7000 for the death. Quotation from the opinion :
"The first point urged is that the United
States court was without jurisdiction because,
while the plaintiff is a citizen of Delaware and
defendants citizens of Texas, Jesse L. Dowdell
and Mrs. Ina Dowdell are to be considered for
the purpose of jurisdiction as joint plaintiffs, and
that at the time the original suit was filed they
were citizens of Texas. We do not think this
point is well taken. Here the plaintiff, because
of payments made and contracts entered into, had
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become pecuniarily interested in this cause of
action. The statute of Texas had deprived the
employe and his representatives, who elected to
hold the insurance association of all right to
institute an action against a wrongdoer. The right
to institute suit was by the statute lodged in the
association. It was subrog·ated to all rights of
the employe and his representatives, is authorized
to sue in its own name, with the right to reimburse
itself all sums it had paid and its reasonable attorney's fee, as fixed by the court, and was accountable only for any surplus then left to the
legal beneficiary. The entire legal title to the
cause of action was under this statute vested in
the association primarily for its own security.
This made it the sole party plaintiff on whose
citizenship the jurisdiction depended. As has
been said by the Supreme Court of the United
States.'' (Italics inserted.)
And then follows the above quotation from the
opinion of ~Ir. Justice Bradley in the Gaines case.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit
continues:
''Though other persons may be interested in
the recovery and named in the complaint as usees,
they are not parties to the action and their citizenship is not to be considered in determining jurisdiction, where the legal title is vested in a party
with a substantial interest.
This decision and the statutes of the State of Texas
will hold the intense interest of anyone interested in the
law.
Staples vs. Central Surety & Ins. Corporation,
62 Fed. (2d) 650 (10 C. C. A. 1921).
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In reading this case it must be remembered that
the rights and liabilities arise in the State of Oklahoma
where actions for injuries have been made to survive
by express statute since the year 1909, and where the
subrogee master or insurance carrier is limited in right
of recovery of damages against the third person to the
amount paid in satisfying the compensation award.
Ridley vs. United Sash & Door Co., 98 Okla. 80;
224 Pac. 351 (1924).
As Mr. Justice Pratt said:
"They" (referring to cases) "must be read
in the light of the statutes of the state from which
they are taken.''
Recurring to the Staples case and to the opinion
written by Mr. District Judge Pollock, sitting as a
circuit judge, it appears that one Clyde J. Goulger, a
servant of an employer named Bush, was injured by a
boiler explosion caused by Staples and others. Goulger
made claim for compensation from his employer Bush
under the Workmen's Compensation law of Oklahoma
and received an award of $2230.50. The Central Surety
& Ins. Company, pursuant to its contract of insurance
with Bush, the employer, paid the amount awarded and
in addition thereto paid out the further sum of $1161.50
on account of medical aid and hospital expenses for
Goulger as a result of his injuries, and then it paid out
legal expenses amounting to $200 in connection with
Goulger 's claim. The total expenditure was $3592. The
insurance carrier was subrogated to Bush's rights
against Staples, et al. Among others this question
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arose: \Y as the insurance carrier 1n this Staples case
an assignee 1 J udg·e Pollock said :
"The determination of this issue turns upon
the question of whether or not the cause of action
alleged by the Central Surety and Insurance
Corporation is an assigned one within the meaning
of Section 24 ( 1) of the Judicial Code. We think
not. Subrogation is not assignment within the
meaning of that section." (Citing authorities.)
The Court held that the insurance carrier received
nothing by reason of the consent of Bush, the employer,
and that the right of subrogation did not rest upon any
relation of contract or privity, but it rested upon, in fact
derived its existence from, the law. For these reasons
the insurance carrier was not an assignee.
Lynds vs. Van V alkenburgh, 77 Kan. 24; 93 Pac.
615 (1908).
It is not believed that any case can be found containing a more satisfactory explanation of the difference
between an assignment and subrogation. This explanation is quoted by the Kansas Court from the case of
Gatewood vs. Gatewood, 75 Va. 407, 410. The Court also
cites Binford vs. Adams, 104 Ind. 41; 3 N. E. 753 (1885).
This Indiana case has to do with the legal effect of the
payment of a promissory note by a third person having
no interest to protect, holding that such a payment by
such a person extinguishes the debt. Equity will subrogate the third person who pays if such person has an
interest to protect by payment, but equity will not subrogate the third person who pays and who has no interest
in the matter to protect. Such third person must have
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a contract whereby the rights of the maker of the note
are transferred to the third person who pays the amount
thereof.
No better statement of the distinction can be made
than to quote from the Kansas case as it quoted from the
Virginia case. ( 93 Pac. 620.)
''Subrogation and equitable assignment are
acts of the law as distinguished from assignment
by acts of parties. 'We must be careful to distinguish between an assignment of the mortgage
debt and a mere right of subrogation to the lien
of the mortgage creditor. Assignment is the act
of the parties, and depends generally upon intention. Where the nature of the transaction is such
as imports a payment of the debt and a consequent
discharge of the mortgage, there can, of course,
be no assignment, for the lien of the mortgage is
extinguished by the payment. A mortgage
creditor cannot be compelled to assign the debt
and mortgage upon receiving payment. All that
he can be required to do is to give an acquittance
and release. The exception to this rule, if it
can be so termed, is found in those cases where
the party making the payment occupies the position of surety to the debt, or is in some way personally bound for its payment. Such a person
may, in equity require an assignment or transfer,
not only of the mortgage itself, but of all the
securities held by the creditor, for his protection
and indemnity, and, although no such assignment
or transfer is actually made, a court of equity
will treat it as having been done. But if the party
making the payment does not occupy the position
of surety for the debt, as a general rule he cannot
claim to be entitled as assignee unless by agree-
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ment with the creditor. s~tbrogation is, however, a rcry different thing from an assignment.
It is the act of the law, and the creature of a
court of equity, dependiug not upon contract, but
upon the priuciples of equity and justice. It presupposes an actual payment and satisfaction of
the debt secured by the mortgage. But, although
the debt is paid and satisfied, a court of equity
will keep alive the lien for the benefit of the party
who made the payment, provided he as security
for the debt has such an interest in the land as
entitles him to the benefit of the security given
for its payment.'' (Italics ours.)
(It will be noticed that Mr. Justice McDonough in
his dissenting opinion said, "This right was transferred
by operation of law to the insurance carrier upon the
dependents' election to take compensation and the payment thereof.")
In the case at the bar it is most earnestly submitted
that· this Court failed to appreciate the distinction between "legal subrogation" on the one hand and" conventional subrogation" on the other; the act of the law on
one side and the act of the parties on the other.
Bingham vs. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 Utah, 149;
283 Pac. 1055 (1929).
In this Bingham case there was involved the right of
the defendant to be subrogated to the rights and remedies
of the :.McMillan heirs in reference to a debt of $4500
which was paid by the defendant to said McMillan heirs.
The Trial Court had denied the right of subrogation and
this Court was called upon to review the ruling of the
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Trial Court. In its opinion the Court stated the question
involved:
''Do the facts in the instant case bring the
defendant or its intestate within the principle
upon which the doctrine of equitable assignment
by subrogation, either legal or conventional,
rests~,,

The Court made a clear distinction between ''legal
subrogation'' and ''conventional subrogation,'' stating
(quoting Par. 7 of syllabi):
'' 'Legal subrogation' results where person
pays debt of another by reason of relation of
surety or because compelled to pay debt to protect
his own rights of property and not as direct result
of an agreement." (Italics inserted.)
"Legal subrogation" rests on compulsion; "conventional subrogation'' is the direct result of consent or
agreement.
Starkweather vs. Cleveland Surety Co., 22 Fed. Cas.
1091, Case No. 13308 (1870).
In this Starkweather case the insured had become
bankrupt. An assignee had been appointed and property
had been destroyed by fire. The insurance company
contended that there could be no recovery by the assignee
in bankruptcy because the fire insurance policy read,
"If the title to the property is transferred or changed,
this policy shall be void, and if without the written
consent of the company this policy shall be assigned, it
shall be void. ' '
The direct question present for adjudication was:
Is the assignment of the register in bankruptcy to the
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assignee both of the policy and of the property insured
a Yiolation of the above provisions quoted from the
policy, and does that assignment exonerate the company
from liability? In rendering its opinion the Court did
not use the terms ''legal'' and ''conventional'' but it
classified assignments as of two kinds, one in fact and
one in law. Quoting from the opinion:
''An assignee in fact is one to whom an assignment has been made in fact by the party having a right to assign. An assignee in law is one
in whom the law vests the right and control in
the property.''
It appeared that under the bankrupt law of England
the Commissioners of Bankruptcy were required to perform certain statutory powers. In this Starkweather
case the Federal Judge quoted Lord Ellenborough as
follows:
''An assignment by the Commissioners in
Bankruptcy is the execution of a statutory power
given them for a particular purpose, viz: the payment of the bankrupt's debts. Nothing passes
from them or nothing ever vested in them. Whatever passes, passes by force of the statute and
for the purpose of effecting the object of the
statute.''
The Starkweather case also contains a quotation
from Lord Kenyon in passing upon the terms of a lease
which contained a covenant that the lessee ''should not
set over, assign, transfer or in any manner dispose of
the lease without the written consent of the lessor.''
The lessee confessed judgment and upon execution issued
thereon the lease was sold. Lord Kenyon said :
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''I adopt the distinction between these acts
which the party does voluntarily, and those that
pass in invitum. Judgment in contemplation of
law, always passes in invitum, and, therefore,
there is no breach.''
The discussion has now advanced to a point where
a distinction should be pointed out between the Starkweather case and the cases cited therein. The bankrupt
owned the property insured and owned the policies of
insurance. The lessees in the case decided by Lord
Kenyon owned the lease. They had title vested in them
to the property which was taken from them by operation
of law.
In the case at bar the dependents of Johanson never
had any title in the right to recover from the third person
• for the wrongful death of the deceased. Section 42-1-58
provided two remedies : (a) and ( z). (These letters have
been adopted because they are the first and the last,
a long way apart.) The dependents had the first choice
to take one and only one. They took remedy (a) or
compensation against the master. The master or the
insurance carrier, when it had paid the compensation,
took remedy ( z), viz: the right to recover from the
third person for wrongfully killing Robert Johanson,
the deceased whose death is involved herein. No transfer was made. The statute gave one remedy, (a), to
the dependents and the other, an entirely different
remedy, (z), to the insurance carrier.
State Brewing Co. vs. Cleveland & St. Louis Ry. Co.,
275 Fed. 330 (7 C. C. A.; 1921).
In this case 1\{r. Circuit Judge Baker, speaking for
a divided court, among other things said:
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"Unless in some other portion of the Act
surh right of action is revived it must remain
forever dead; and it is contrary to rational
thought to say that a suit can be maintained upon
the assignment of a non-existent thing." (P. 333.)
(Italics ours.)
The dhision between the majority and minority of
the court did not dispute the self-evident truth above
quoted.
The dependents, by their election, became vested
with the award of compensation. That was their right,
and when they made this election those dependents were
excluded from every other right under the statute, and
never had any other right under the statute. The statute
did not make an assignment. The dependents did not
make one. The statute did not provide for an assignment even to the insurance carrier. One may say that
it had the same effect as an assignment, but one may
not say that such effect came about by assignment.
The right of the insurance carrier did not result
from contract nor did it pass through, either by operation of law or by contract, the dependents of Johanson.
It was a right directly vested in the insurance carrier
by the plain terms of the statute, and not otherwise. The
mere fact that the measure of damages to be applied to
the carrier's action may be on the one hand the amount
of compensation paid by the insurance carrier, or on the
other the amount of damages which the dependents
might have recovered had there been no election by them
to take compensation, does not and cannot alter the fact
that the insurance carrier sues in its own right and
recovers "for itself" (opinion of Mr. Justice Pratt.)
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Mr. Justice Pratt said, "having accepted compensation
they'' (the dependents) ''are not permitted to sue for
damages for the death of their son.'' And again, ''the
insurance carrier may, if it sees fit, refrain from enforcing the rights it acquired by subrogation, in which
event the dependents-plaintiffs herein-have no complaint. They may not insist that the carrier enforces its
rights.''
Why, if not because they have no rights in the action,¥
They declined to take any rights in that action. The fact,
if it be a fact, that they may share in the recovery when
once that recovery is obtained, does not give them any
rights in the action. It does not make them either real
parties in interest or parties at all.
In the Staples case, supra, where the insurance carrier sued only for the amount it was required to pay out
by reason of the negligence of Staples, Judge Pollock
said:
''The compensation law of Oklahoma has
nothing to do with the case except as it fixed a
liability upon Bush (the employer) for the negligence of appellants. If an automobile belonging
to Bush had been destroyed by the exploding
boiler he or his insurance carrier could have recovered, and there is nothing in the compensation
law to the contrary. Where the injury is to
Bush's servant the compensation law required
Bush to pay, but the financial loss to Bush or his
insurance carrier is just as directly the result
of the appellants' negligence as if its force had
been spent on his automobile instead of his
servant.''
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(It must be remembered that in this Staples case
the court is enforcing the law of Oklahoma where causes
of action for personal injuries have long survived.)
In closing the argument in support of Contention
Xo. 1 it is submitted that this Court erred in holding:

First: That Section 42-1-58, either in terms or in
effect, transferred any rights from the dependents to
the insurance carrier, or for that matter transferred
any rights at all.
Second: That because Section 42-1-58 had the ultimate effect of an assignment of the right of action to
the insurance carrier, such ultimate effect in granting
rights to the insurance carrier ''opened the door completely to general assignability." (Quotation from Mr.
Justice Wolfe's opinion.) (Thi~ ruling of this one
justice has the following unsound results: (a) because
the insurance carrier is a subrogee it is also an assignee
in fact; (b) because the law subrogates the insurance
carrier into rights, such insurance carrier not only
becomes an assignee in fact but this subrogation has the
same legal effect as a statute providing for general
assignability; (c) the statute by this ruling in effect
amends the survivorship statute of Utah, because general
assignability of the right of action transforms the
character of the action from that of a personal right
into one of property, i. e. one capable of inheritance.)
It is submitted that the right of the insurance carrier
was not made assignable by the statute, and that unless
a statute authorized it such right may not be assigned
or "reassigned" by that carrier.
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CONTENTION NO. 2
THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FROM THE DEFENDANT IS STRICTLY PERSONAL IN ITS NATURE. IT IS NOT A PROPERTY
RIGHT.
If the plaintiffs had alleged a request on the part
of the defendant made to the London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., to pay the compensation awarded
against the Salt Company, and such insurance carrier
had paid that award pursuant to said request, then there
would have been a sound basis for implying a promise
on the part of the defendant to reimburse the insurance
carrier for the amount that it had paid out pursuant to
such request. The action to recover the money paid
out would be classified as ex contractu. It would have
survived the death of either a plaintiff or a defendant.
On the death of either or both of such parties it would
be an asset in favor of the estate of the party who paid
the money or a liability against the estate of the party
at whose request the money was paid out. No such
request is alleged in the complaint, nor is there any allegation of either an express or implied promise on the
part of the defendant to reimburse the insurance carrier.
A cause of action for the destruction of property
for which an insurance company must pay under its
policy can be the subject of subrogation without the aid
of statute and without any assignment. If A owns an
automobile which he has insured for its full value stipulated at $2000, and B negligently destroys that automobile so that it is a total loss, the insurance carrier is then
compelled to pay that loss as it was stipulated in the
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policy. Upon payment the insurance carrier is subrogated without any statute and without any assignment,
and that insurance carrier may bring an action in its
own name against B to recoYer from him as a tort-feasor,
not the amount the insurance carrier paid but the value
of the automobile at the time of the loss. B, the tortfeasor, was not a party to the contract of insurance made
by A with the insurance carrier, and for that reason such
contract neither affects nor fixes his liability. The liability of B is delictual and not contractual in character.
The insurance company's right to recover as a subrogee
against B is a property right, because under Sections
102-11-6 and 102-11-7 of the Probate Code of Utah "any
person or his personal representatiYes may maintain
an action against the executor or administrator of any
testator or intestate who in his lifetime has wasted, destroyed, taken or carried away or converted to his own
use the goods or chattels of any such person or committed
any trespass on the real estate of such person.''
B destroyed the chattel of A and if B negligently
or wrongfully committed that act of destruction, then
either he or his estate will be liable in an action sounding
in tort, not in contract. B, the tort-feasor, was not in
any wise enriched or benefited by his destruction of A's
automobile, and for that reason no promise on his part to
pay the damages could be implied. If B had converted
the automobile to his own use instead of destroying it,
his tort could have been waived by the owner of the
automobile, or his subrogee, the insurance carrier, and
an action ex contractu could have been maintained against
B. This action ex contractu would be founded upon the
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enrichment which had inured to B by reason of his wrongful act, but by the destruction of the automobile this
tort-feasor acquired nothing by his wrongful act. The
law compels him to atone for his tort, but such liability
to pay damages to A is essentially different from the
obligation to return the automobile to its owner. The
real injury sustained by A was a tort, and the facts as
assumed do not connect it with any contract relations
between A and B or between Band the insurance carrier,
because no such contract relations exist.
It is impossible to imply a tacit agreement unless
you can imply a promise to pay damages for a tort.
Let it be assumed that A's servant X was killed in
the same accident and B 's negligence was the sole cause
of the accident. At common law A, the master, had no
civil remedy against B, the tort-feasor, because no action
could be maintained for the death of a human being
caused by the wrongful act or negl~gence of another or
for damage suffered by any person by reason of such
death. The question of the survivorship of the action
to the servant's representatives would be irrelevant
because there was no action to survive.
Section 104-3-11, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
provides a remedy to the heirs of X or X 's personal
representative for the benefit of the heirs of X. This
section of the Utah statute is a part of the code of Civil
Procedure and applies only to the death of adults,
(another for minors) and excepts from its operation
cases provided for in Chapter 1 of Title 42. This Section
104-3-11 does not impose any liability on anyone except
the wrongdoer. (Of course the doctrine of respondeat
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superior is made to work against the wrongdoer.)
Without any other statute than Section 104-3-11,
neither the Royal Crystal Salt Company in the case
at bar nor its insurance carrier would have been in any
sense liable to the heirs or dependents of the deceased
serYant, because no one claims that either the master
or the insurance carrier was at fault. The liability of
the master and its insurance carrier to the dependent
resulted from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Royal Crystal Salt Company, the
employer, was required to pay compensation by reason
of the provisions of that Act, and the election of the
dependents, and the insurance company was compelled
to pay that liability because of the provisions of its
insurance contract with the Royal Crystal Salt Company.
Without the aid of a statute changing the common law
and otherwise providing, neither the Salt Company nor
the insurance carrier would have had any remedy against
the person whose wrongful act caused the death of the
servant.
Admiralty Commissioners vs. Steamship America,
A. C. 38 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 877 ( 1917).
Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame, 95 U. S. 754;
24 L. Ed. 580.
These cases and others have already been discusse<\
in this brief. They are not in conflict with the following
cases:
Travelers' Ins. Co. vs. Great Lakes Engineering Co.,
184 Fed. 426, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 60 (6 C. C. A.;
1911).
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Staples vs. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 62 Fed. (2d)
650 (10 C. C. A.; 1932).
Take the Travelers' case first, for that is .the one
where the death of Leinhart was involved. The insurance
company in its petition sought to recover the sum of
$2855, itemized as follows:
Money paid out :
For the wrongful death of
Joseph Leinhart --------------------------------------$2750
Court costs ------------------------------------------------------ 15
For injury to Edward Wund ------------------------ 75
Court costs ------------------------------------------------------ 15
Total ----------------------------------------------------------$2855
The plaintiff alleged as a ground of recovery that
the death of Leinhart and the injury of Wund were
caused by the negligence of the Engineering Company
while it was installing a refrigerating machine and a
steam engine in the place of business of the Herancourt
Brewing Company. The deceased and injured person
apove named were employees of the Brewing Company.
The plaintiff was the insurance carrier of that Brewing
Company. There was an express stipulation in its policy
of insurance providing for the right of subrogation.
The defendant contended that as to the death of
Leinhart, the petition did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, and with the Leinhart item
taken out, the jurisdictional amount, to wit: $2000, would
not be involved and the Federal Court would have no
jurisdiction. (The jurisdictional amount' of the Federal
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Court was required to be in excess of $2000 up until
1912.) The sole question involved in the case as reported
could be stated in the language of the Court:
.. \Yhether the insurer, by reason of a contract of indemnity against employers' liability,
such as exists here, can maintain an action against
a third party whose negligence has caused liability
to the insured employer for injuries resulting in
the death of its employee."
Circuit Judge Knappen of Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, commented upon the Brame case and said:
''the insurance contract there involved was not
one of indemnity to those injured by the death,
but was a wagering contract. The principle of
subrogation could have no application to that
case, because rights thereunder must have been
asserted in the name of the insured, and whatever right of action he may have had abated with
his death." (Italics ours.)
He also ref erred to the decision from Connecticut
involving the death of Dr. Beach, which he also said
rested upon the same ground as the Brame case.
Is this statement entirely accurate~ If the contract
of insurance upon the life of either McLemore or Beach
had been a wagering contract, then it would have been
void as against public policy. No greater element of
wager inhered in the policies of McLemore or Beach
than that which inhered in the policy where Leinhart
was involved. A wager policy is one in which the beneficiary has no interest whatsoever in the subject matter
covered by the insurance, whether it is life or property,
but only an interest in its loss or destruction.
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32 Corpus Juris, 1094.
Steinbeck vs. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. 24; 52 N. E. 662
70 Am. St. 424; 44 L. R. A. 417 (1898).
(Opinion by Chief Justice Parker.)
Then again, the right of the insurance company to
recover as a subrogee for the wrongful death of McLemore, of course, could not have been asserted in the
name of McLemore. McLemore was dead and he had no
right of action. None abated because none existed. It
was his death that caused pecuniary loss to the insurance
carrier. That carrier to recover from Brame was required to have an action in its own right by reason of
Brame's wrongful act which resulted in the death of
. McLemore; or as a subrogee of some person who had
been given a right of recovery because of the wrongful
death of McLemore by the Louisiana death statute. The
court decided that the insurance company had no right
of its own, even though that company had suffered a
pecuniary loss of $7000 by reason of McLemore's death.
Company had no right under death statute.
Of course, it will readily occur to anyone who thinks
about it that an insurance contract could be made against
loss of earning power by reason of accident or death
to cover a period of time stipulated in the policy while
the insured might work, and the right of subrogation
of the insurance carrier paying any loss occasioned by
accident or death against anyone negligently causing
such loss could be made a part of such contract. Unless
the insurance policy provided for subrogation, it is submitted such right would not exist.
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Connecticut ~Iutual Life Ins. Co. YS. New York, N.H.
Ry. Co., ~5 Conn. ~65; 65 Am. Dec. 571 (1856).
(Beach case. where right of subrogation is discussed.)
Gatzweiler vs. :Milwaukee Ry. Co., 136 Wis. 34;
116 N. \Y. 633; 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 211 (1908).
(See note, 65 Am. Dec. 629, where cases are collected,
and note 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 211.)
The petition in the Travelers' case was held sufficient in its facts because of the rule whereby an employer
not in fault who has been compelled to pay damages to
a third person for the negligence of his agent or employee
may maintain an action over against agent or employee
to recover what employer has been compelled to pay.
After pointing out this rule, Judge Knapp en said:
''The brewing company thus had, by virtue
of its alleged relations with the engineering company, a right of action over against the latter for
negligence on its part which caused legal damage
to the brewing company. The injury to the brewing company resulting from that negligence was
direct and immediate.''
In the next paragraph of the opinion he said:
"With respect to injuries not causing death,
as in the case of W und, we apprehend this proposition would not be questioned. With respect to
the damage resulting from Leinhart 's death, the
fact that Leinhart had no right of action is immaterial. There is no attempt to recover herein
any right of his. The ground of the recovery
sought is that the engineering company failed in
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its primary and positive duty toward the brewing
company, whereby the latter company sustained
a loss. It can make no difference with its right
of action over, that the original recovery against
it belonged to one person rather than another,to the widow and children rather than to the
representative of Leinhart's estate. Under the
allegations of the petition, the negligence of the
engineering company was the direct and sole
cause of Leinhart's death, and thus of the damages
suffered by the brewing company." (Would
Leinhart 's contributory negligence be a defense

n

Judge Knappen pointed out in his statement of facts
that the policy of insurance subrogated to the extent of
its payment the insurance carrier to all rights of recovery
by employer for loss by the assured.
The subrogation in the Travelers' case was one
where the insurance carrier obtained the rights of the
Brewing Company by virtue of the contract of insurance
made between the Insurance Company and the Brewing
Company. To recover, the Insurance Company was required to prove, according to Judge Knappen's opinion,
that Leinhart's death occurred through the negligence
of the Engineering Company, and also the extent of the
damages recoverable by his relatives on account of that
death. (This is practically a quotation from the latter
part of the court's opinion, and from it the inference is
inevitable that the action against Engineering Company
IS delictual and not contractual in character.)
Take the Staples case from the Tenth Circuit. The
insurance company paid out the full amount of the award,
to wit: $2230.50, and in addition thereto the further
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sum of $1161.50 on account of medical aid and hospital
expenses incurred in treating the insured. The insurance
carrier sought to recoYer from Staples the total of these
two amounts, to wit: $3592, paid out pursuant to its
contract of indemnity insurance. This contract contained
a provision that in case of any payment under said contract the insurance carrier should be subrogated to the
extent of any such payment to all rights of recovery
therefor vested by law in Bush or in any employee or his
dependents, against persons, corporations, associations,
or estates. Personal injury to one Gougler, an employee
of Bush, was the occasion of the above payments.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking by
Judge Pollock, pointed out that upon the question of
negligence no issue was raised on the appeal, and then
said:
"It is a well-recognized rule, supported by a
great weight of authority, that, where one has
been subjected to liability, and has suffered loss
thereby, on account of the negligence or wrongful
act of another, the one has a right of action against
the other for indemnity.''
After reviewing certain cases he continued:
"Upon this settled principle, it is clear that
Bush, having been subjected to liability to his
employee, Gougler, under the Compensation Law,
as a result of the negligence of appellants, had a
cause of action, in his own right, for indemnity
against appellants, at common law entirely independent of any provisions of the Compensation
Law. And the appellee, having discharged Bush's
liability to Gougler, pursuant to its contract of
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insurance, is subrogated to Bush's right against
appellants.''
And again:
''The appellee does not sue for the unliquidated damages suffered by Gougler; it sues only for
the amount it was required to pay out by reason
of the negligence of appellants." (This is Oklahoma law. See Ridley and other Okla. cases.)
He finally says in substance that no inquiry need
be made whether Gougler had any right to pursue his
remedy against appellants, or whether such right had
been abrogated by the Compensation Law of Oklahoma,
stating:
''The Compensation Law of Oklahoma has
nothing to do with the case, except as it fixed a
liability upon Bush for the negligence of the
appellants.''
(The Compensation Law of Oklahoma did not fix
any liability upon Bush, the employer, or anybody else,
for the negligence of the appellants or anybody else.
The negligence of Staples may have caused the injury
to Gougler, but the liability of the employer under the
Compensation Act arose merely from the injury, and
that liability was fixed by applying the standards prescribed by the Act itself, without the consideration of
any element of fault or wrong on the part of anybody.)
The last paragraph of Judge Pollock's opinion is
interesting. He says :
"If an automobile belonging to Bush had
been destroyed by the exploding boiler, he or his
insurance carrier could have recovered, and there
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is nothing in the Compensation Law to the contrary. \\'here the injury is to Bush's servant,
the Compensation Law required Bush to pay;
but the financial loss to Bush or his insurance
carrier is just as directly the result of appellants'
negligence as if its force had been spent on his
automobile instead of his servant.''
(Does Judge Pollock mean that in an action by the
insurance carrier against a tort-feasor for negligently
destroying an automobile the measure of damages could
be determined by the amount the insurance carrier had
been compelled under its contract of insurance to pay
to the person who had owned the automobile at the time
of its destruction? It is to be hoped that a proper
construction of the language quoted is to the effect that
the tort-feasor pays the full value of the thing destroyed
by him as it might be determined in a case where he
was a party, and no more than that value as it might
be determined in such a case.) See also Grand Rapids
Lumber Co. vs. Blair 190 Mich. 518; 157 N. W. 29 (1916).
The purpose of the Compensation Act was that payments under it should be a partial substitute for wages
that might have been earned by the employee had he
not been injured or killed. To achieve these purposes
the compensation awarded is paid in periodical installments rather than in a lump sum. It takes a substantial
showing to obtain a lump-sum-award. The right to these
payments is a personal one either to the injured employee
or to his dependents in case of death. It is well known
that these unfortunate persons need protection not only
as against strangers but even as against their own improvidence. The right to compensation under that Act
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and the right to recover damages from the tort-feasor
are so different in character that in the absence of some
statute applying the rule of subrogation that rule would
be entirely inapplicable.
Newark Paving Co. vs. Klotz, 85 N. J. L., 432; 91
Atl. 41 (1914).
In this case the Court said :
''If the statutory compensations were subject to deductions by reason of payments made
by a third person, the tort-feasor, to the person
injured or to his dependents, in satisfaction of
the liability for the tort, this object of the statute
would be thwarted, and in effect the commutation
to a lump sum would take place without any
order of the court and at the will of the injured
party or his representatives. If, on the other
hand, the employer were allowed to recover of
the tort-feasor by action in the name of the
employe or his representative, he would be able
to recover in advance of payments by him and at
a time when the extent of his own liability could
not be ascertained.''
Has the Compensation Act made the servant working in the course of his employment analogous to a machine used in the industry where the servant works,
so that the master or the insurance carrier of that master
has a property right in the servant as in an automobile
while he is working in the course of his employment¥
May the insurance carrier recover for the destruction
of that right to the extent of its loss~ If anyone shall
answer these questions in the affirmative, he will find
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it impossible to extricate himself from the dilemma
created by his affirmative answer.
The action to be prosecuted against the wrongdoer
1s not mentioned in Sections 102-11-5, 102-11-6 and
102-11-7, and therefore even though it may be called a
property right, it is not capable of inheritance under
those sections, and those sections are exclusive. Anyone
who wades that ditch will find the water more than chindeep. Looking at the action from the standpoint of the
wrongdoer, his liability ceases with his death.
Section 104-3-19 provides:

''An action or proceeding does not abate by
the death or any disability of a party, or by the
transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of
action or proceeding survives or continues." (Italics ours.)
No person reading this statute can escape the inference that if the cause of action does not survive, then
the pending action abates and cannot be revived.
CONTENTION NO. 3
THE RIGHT CLAIMED IN THE COMPLAINT IS A
PERSONAL RIGHT WHICH THE DEPENDENTS
MIGHT HAVE ELECTED TO TAKE; IT IS NOT A
PROPERTY RIGHT.
Regardless of the rights of the insurance carrier
under Section 42-1-58, or independent of that statute, an
examination of the complaint in the case at bar compels
and permits but one conclusion, and that is that the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages from the defendant
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on the ground that the defendant has violated the personal rights of the deceased, Robert Johanson, causing a
personal injury to said Johanson, and that said personal
injury caused the death of Johanson. These plaintiffs
claim that they were dependent upon the deceased for
support. They unequivocally allege that they claimed
and were awarded compensation for and on account of
the death of the servant, and now they seek, by means
of the alleged assignment, to thwart and nullify the election which they intentionally made to take compensation.
The purpose of the statute was to give the dependents
a choice of one of two remedies. That statute in plain
terms provides that when compensation is claimed by
dependents and awarded to them, they have completely
and forever exhausted their remedies and consequent
rights against all persons for and on account of the death
of the servant. By making their claim for compensation,
and obtaining its award, they debarred and precluded
themselves from thereafter making any further claim
either for compensation or damages.
It is true that in their complaint they do not allege
that the insurance carrier has paid the compensation
awarded, or any part thereof, and they make no allegation from which such fact might be inferred. As indicating a possible desire to exclude such fact from the complaint, they allege that the insurance carrier, by reason
of the award, ''became subrogated to the rights of the
plaintiffs herein in said cause of action against the defendant under the provisions of Section 42-1-58 Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933; that subsequent thereto, on the
29th day of August, 1939, the said London Guarantee &
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Accident Company, Ltd., for a valuable consideration,
executed and delivered to the plaintiffs herein a waiver
of said right of subrogation and an assignment of its
said cause of action against said defendant herein.''
(Italics inserted.)
If this allegation is given its full force it means:
(a) that the insurance carrier was subrogated without
payment of the award; (b) that without payment of the
award the insurance carrier, for a valuable consideration,
waived its right of subrogation; (c) in order to make such
alleged waiver effective, to clinch the same, so to speak,
the insurance carrier made an assignment to the plaintiffs.

In appellants' brief, on Page 14 it is said: "It is to
be noted, however, that the insurance carrier not only
assigned its cause of action but waived its right of subrogation."
It is then contended in that brief that
aside from the assignment and waiver the plaintiffs can
maintain this action in view of their interest.
This Court in its opinion has held that the plaintiffs
cannot maintain this action in their own right; that Section 42-1-58 offered them one of either of two alternatives; that their acceptance of either waived their rights
under the other; that they have no right in the action to
recover damages from the third person after they have
claimed and been awarded compensation; that they may
not even insist that an action against the third person
shall be brought by the insurance carrier.
th~t

All of the justices of this court seem to be agreed
the plaintiffs must sue, if they may sue at all, as
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assignees of the insurance carrier's cause of action. All
of the justices seem to agree that except for the provisions of Section 42-1-58 (which has been shown not to
authorize any assignment) the only test of assignability
of an action is survivability.
Now, if the attempt of the dependants is made successful by the decision of this Court, then that which was
made an irrevocable election ~their part becomes revocable at any time during the period required for the payment of the award of compensation, or during the period while the action is not barred by the statute of limitations. These dependents during that period, however,
indefinite it may be, may ignore, even flout, the award
of the Industrial Commission and agree with the insurance carrier that the award need not be paid, and in consideration of its release the dependents may take that
which they never had-the right to bring an action against
the third party as if they, the dependents, had never
claimed or obtained an award of compensation.
The action alleged in the complaint does not survive
because it is not an action:
(1) For the recovery of any property, real or
personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet
title thereto or to determine any adverse claim there-

on;
nor
(2) Is it an action founded upon contract (express or implied (Section 102-11-5);
nor
( 3) Is it an action against any person who has
wasted, destroyed, taken, carried away or converted
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to his own use the goods of a testator or intestate in
his lifetime;
nor

Is it an action for trespass committed on
the real estate of a decedent in his lifetime (Section
102-11-6);
( 4)

nor
( 5) Is it an action against executor or administrator of any testator or intestate who in his lifetime has wasted, destroyed, taken, carried away or
converted to his own use the goods or chattels of
any such person or committed any trespass on the
real estate of such person. (Section 102-11-7.)

The action for which recovery is sought is not included in the survivor statutes of the Probate Code of
this state. Therefore, it does not survive. Even if pending in court, it abates unless it survives or continues.
(Sections 104-3-19.)
Not surviving, it is not a property right. Even under
the broad terms of the Probate Code, only those things
which survive are capable of inheritance. These and only
these are property in the true sense of that word. Everything generally assignable or capable of general assignability is capable of inheritance, and is property because
when it is generally assignable it is capable of a legal existence, separate and apart from its original owner. If it
is generally assignable it is not in any sense personal to
its owner; it is from a legal standpoint as sound and
as capable of use, enjoyment, protection and enforce-
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ment when owned by any person as when owned by one
particular person.
The right to recover damages for injuries resulting
in death is one created by statute. The first statute was
passed in this territory in 1874. With the coming of statehood the power of the legislature to abrogate that right
of action was prohibited by the Constitution; but in 1920
the people of this state amended the Constitution and
provided that the legislature might abrogate the right
of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in
death if compensation for such injuries was provided by law. This Supreme Court has held that because of the amendment of 1920 the legislature may provide compensation in lieu of the right to recover damages, but the legislature may not take from the dependents their rights to some compensation.
Halling vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah,
112; 263 Pac. 78 (1927).
It seems clear that while under the constitutional
provision as it has existed since 1920, the legislature of
this state has no power to entirely abrogate the right of
the dependents of a deceased servant to compensation,
that legislature may, after providing for such compensation, entirely deny to the dependents the right of action
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death.
In the case at bar that right to recover damages
never vested in the dependents. They had the choice of
the two remedies and they voluntarily and intelligently
elected to take the right to compensation. From thereon
their right to recover damages was as nonexistent as at
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common law. The insurance carrier had no vested right
to recoYer damages for injuries resulting in the death of
Johanson until it had paid the compensation awarded.
The right of action of tort for personal injuries is not
property.
niulvey YS. City of Boston, 83 N. E. 402; 197
Mass. 178; 14 Ann. Cas. 349 (1908).
If the injur:~ did not result in death, then at common
law it was a valuable personal right. If the injury resulted in death, no right of recoYery existed.
In the :Jiassachusetts case just cited, Mr. Chief Justice Knowlton, referring to a claim in an action of tort,
said:
''In some sense of the word such a claim is
not property. It is not assignable, and it cannot
be appropriated by creditors in proceedings in
bankruptcy or insolvency.''
Holt vs. Stollenwerck, 17 4 Ala. 213; 56 So.
912 (1911).
In this Alabama case the facts were, that the widow
of Charles ~I. Bryan intermarried with T. G. Holt, pending a suit by Bryan's administrator to recover damages
for his wrongful death. Afterwards, while the suit was
yet undetermined, the wife of Holt and widow of Bryan
died. Still later the administrator had a recovery of
substantial damages. The surviving second husband
petitioned the court to be allowed to participate in the
damages which had been recovered because of the death
of Bryan, the first husband. These damages constituted
the entire estate of Mrs. Holt.
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Under the statutes of Alabama it is provided that if
a married woman having a separate estate died intestate,
leaving a husband living, he was entitled to one-half of
the estate. It was further provided by the Alabama statutes that all of the property of the wife held by her previous to the marriage, or to which she became entitled
after the marriage, was her separate property, not subject to the liabilities of the husband. The death statute
provided that the damages recovered were not subject
to the payment of the debts or liabilities of the testator
or intestate, but must be distributed according to the
statute of distribution. (When judgment was recovered
it was property.)
According to the Utah law as it has existed from
the time of its first death statute to the present day, the
proceeds recovered in a death action have never been
subject to the payments of the debts or liabilities of the
deceased, but have always been a fund for particularly
named beneficiaries.
In this Alabama case the second husband contended
that the cause of action arising out of the death of Mrs.
Holt's first husband became a part of the property of
her estate. The Alabama court said:
"we state our conclusion that the mere right to
sue for damages conferred by section 2486 of the
Code, is not property, within the meaning of the
statutes of distribution.''
By way of discussion the Court further said:
"It is the generally, if not universally, accepted American doctrine that all causes of action
arising. from torts to real or personal property,
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by zchich its value is di·rninished, as well as choses
ex contractu, survive and pass to the executor
or administrator as assets in his hand, and are
in consequence assignable. See note to McCormack vs. Toronto Railway Company, 7 Am. &
Eng. Ann. Cas. 500. It is also well settled that,
in the absence of statutory provision, rights of
action for torts purely personal do not survive,
and are not assignable. Weller vs. Jersey City
Railway Company, 68 N. J. Eq. 659, 61 Atl. 459;
Id., 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 442. Scores of
adjudicated cases might be cited to both these
propositions. The right to prosecute an action
for the wrongful death of his decedent is vested
by the statute creating the right in the personal
representative for a definite legislative purpose,
to prevent homicide. In prosecuting such action,
the personal representative does not act strictly
in his capacity as administrator of the estate of
his decedent, because he is not proceeding to reduce to possession the estate of his decedent, but
rather he is asserting a right arising after his
death, and because the damages recovered are not
subject to the payment of the debts or liabilities
of the decedent. He acts rather as an agent of
legislative appointment for the effectuation of
the legislative policy, and upon recovery as a
quasi trustee for those who stand in the relation
of distributees to the estate strictly so called.
White vs. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 45 South. 166,
18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568. And the right is vested
in the personal representative alone. No one else,
under any circumstances except in case of the
death of a minor child, where section 2485 gives
a preferred right ot the father or mother, cam
maintain the action in any forum. The mere right
of action is therefore nonassignable at law and
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in equity. The right of disposition is inherent in
every notion of property. On these considerations of general law, we are of opinion that Mrs.
Holt had no property right in the cause of action
created by the statute. Her right was personal
merely.'' (Italics inserted.)
If anyone cares to read the balance of the opinion
he will find the Court holding that the words ''things
in action, '' as used in another section of the Code, include
only assignable rights of action, and that "no debt arises
out of tort.''
It is settled law in this state that the right of action
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death is
for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased under Section
104-3-11. The personal representative of the deceased
may be a party plaintiff in prosecuting the action, but
he prosecutes for the benefit of the heirs of the
deceased.
Under Section 42-1-58 the dependents of the employee, in case the latter's injury results in death, may
at their option claim compensation or have their action
for damages against the third person whose act wrongfully caused the death of the employee. If they do not
take compensation they are then vested with the right
of action which may exist against the third person. This
action they prosecute in their own names, and, as has
been held by the Utah Supreme Court in Thorpe vs.
Union Pacific Railway Co., 24 Utah, 475, supra, the
action cannot be commenced or maintained in the name
of any other person than the one to whom the right is
given by the statute. If the dependents claim and are
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awarded compensation, then the statutory party plaintiff
is either the master or its insurance carrier. This insurance carrier under these circumstances is the only
person who can maintain the action in any form. On
recovery, if there is a recovery, the insurance carrier
plaintiff becomes a judgment-creditor, and as such that
carrier is charged with the duty of distributing the fund
recovered according to the terms of the statute.
Nature of .Action; It ·is not Contractual: It is believed to have been established that no basis can be found
for either the origin or existence of this right of action
in contract, express or implied.
It is not Proprietary in Character: A mere violation
of a duty imposed by law, resulting in pecuniary loss
to the person whose rights are violated without enrichment or pecuniary gain to the tort-feasor cannot give
rise to a proprietary remedy. The inconvenience, distress or pecuniary prejudice of that person cannot be
conceived of as a res or thing in the possession of· the
wrongdoer. The value of the estate of the deceased
was in no wise diminished by the wrongful act. No debt
arises out of tort in advance of judgment, and the proceeds of the judgment become the property of the insurance carrier, to be used and paid out as is provided
by statute. What is said here of a breach of duty imposed
by law is equally true of a broken promise.
Keigwin Cases in Common Law Pleading, P. 38.
It is an .Action Ex Delicto: The injured person may
have suffered great pecuniary loss without the wrongdoer
being enriched in the slightest particular. Under such
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circumstances, in the absence of an express contract to
reimburse, the only remedy remaining is for the personal
tort. That and only that constitutes the wrong. There
is no breach of contract because there is no contract.
There is no money had and received either wrongfully
or as a loan, or paid out upon request. There is no property received by way of bailment or conversion. Not the
slightest benefit passed to the wrongdoer. There was
not the slightest depletion of the estate of the deceased.
It is charged in the complaint of the plaintiffs that
the defendant negligently caused the death of their son,
Robert Johanson. If such fact is established by proof,
the defendant must answer for the damage caused to
the dependents by its tort. It is the damage done to
and the loss sustained by the dependents that constitutes the measure of recovery. If that measure is to be
determined by the enrichment of the defendant, there
could be recovery. If recovery by insurance carrier
under this section of the statute is limited to the money
paid out by insurance carrier to satisfy the award of
compensation, then that is a mere limitation of damages
on the theory that the insurance company suffered no
greater loss than that which it paid out, and that the
dependents can have no interest in the recovery. Albrecht
Co. vs. Iron Works, 200 Mich. 109; 166 N. W. 855 (1918).
Even under this construction of the statute, the action
against the defendant is still what it would have been
if the dependents had elected to prosecute it in their own
names for themselves.
At common law the action was trespass on the case.
It was not debt, detinue, covenant, trespass, ejectment
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or replevin. These were the common law actions prior
to A. D. 1~85. It was not trover; it was not assumpsit,
but it was trespass on the case. Case, trover and assumpsit eame into existence by virtue of the Statute
of Westminster, 1~85. (It is well to recur to these rather
ancient actions.)
Prior to that year there was no remedy:
''I. For wrongs to person or property which
were done without force;
II. For wrongs which, though involving
force, were not immediately injurious, but only
indirectly and by consequence ;
III. For wrongs which, though forcible and
in themselves injurious, affected property not
in the possession of the owner ; and
IV. For breaches of executory contracts not
under seal, such as failure to perform a parol
promise.''
Keigwin Cases in Common Law Pleading, P. 126.
It will be noticed that in the survivor statutes, Sections 102-11-5, 102-11-6 and 102-11-7, causes of action
arising from torts to real or personal property by which
the estate's value is diminished (without any enrichment
of wrongdoer) survive for and against the estates of
deceased persons. These are causes of action ex delicto.
They are purely personal torts committed as against
the property, and because their destruction or injury
diminishes the value of the estate of the persons owning
such property, these rights of action have been made to
survive along with the others designated in the statute;
but the statutes can be read and re-read and no provision
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can be found from which it may be concluded that there
is any property right claimed. in this complaint of the
plaintiffs. There is no property right created by the
provisions of the statute Sec. 42-1-58. The only property
right that could exist would be one worked out on the
theory of the Louisiana case, 93 So. 613. (Supra.) That
theory is at war with all sound legal concept.

CONTENTION NO. 4
THE INSURANCE CARRIER ACQUIRED NO PERSONAL OR PROPERTY RIGHT UNTIL IT HAD
PAID IN FULL THE COMPENSATION AWARD.
AN ASSIGNMENT OF A NON-EXISTENT RIGHT
IS VOID.
The discussion of Contentions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 has
necessarily explained the reasons which constitute the
basis for Contention No. 4.
As the writer of this brief understands the opinions
of this Court, it seems unnecessary to argue that it was
full payment of the award of compensation by the insurance carrier that vested in that carrier any right of
action against the defendant. The assignment of a nonexistent right of action would be a nullity, even though
the right of action when it came into existence would
under the law be assignable. An executory agreement
to assign a right of action not yet in existence would
not and could not mature the right of action. To mature
it, requires full payment.
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As Federal J udg·e Baker said :
''It is contrary to rational thought to say
that a suit can be maintained upon the assignment
of a non-existent thing." ( 27 5 Fed. 333.)
See also Albrecht Co. vs. Iron Works, 200
Mich. 109; 166 N. W. 855 (1918).
If the thing itself cannot legally exist, then any
assignment of such non-existent thing is also non-existent.

CONTENTION NO. 5
THIS COURT, HAVING HELD THAT THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT
TO CONSITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION, HAD NO
POWER TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OR TO
ALLOW THE PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR
COMPLAINT.
It would seem that the above statement cannot
be otherwise than absolutely accurate from a legal standpoint. Let us look at the record facts as they are shown
by the transcript.

It appears from the transcript, not only from its
minute entries but from the judgment itself, that the
Trial Court heard this case on the 4th day of April,
A. D. 1940, on the complaint of the plaintiffs and the
demurrer of the defendant thereto, all counsel appearing; that thereafter, on the 6th day of May, A. D. 1940,
the Trial Court made an order sustaining the demurrer
of the defendant to the plaintiffs' complaint, and in
said order allowed the plaintiffs ten days within which
to amend; that regular notice in writing was given
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by the attorneys for the defendant and served upon the
attorneys for the plaintiffs on the 6th day of May, A. D.
1940; and it further appears "that the plaintiffs, by
their attorneys, have declined this right to amend and
failed and refused to plead further, and thereby elected
to stand upon the complaint of the plaintiffs, and the
time having fully expired within which the plaintiffs
might make any amendment to said complaint," it was
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs take
nothing by their action; that the complaint be and the
same is hereby dismissed. This judgment was entered
in open court on the 17th day of May, A. D. 1940.
(Tr. 12-13.)
(Please examine the Transcript.}
The Trial Court did not deliver or file any opinion,
stating the reasons that impelled that Court to sustain
the demurrer. The demurrer, however, was a general
one, and under the Utah Code the objection that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action may be raised in a cause at any stage
of the proceedings. (Sec. 104-8-6.)
At common law and under the Code of Utah the
granting of leave to amend a complaint is discretionary
with the Trial Court when a demurrer has been sustained
by the Court, and an appellate court will not interfere
with the trial court's discretion unless a clear abuse of
that discretion by the Trial Court is shown; but there
need be no concern relative to an abuse of discretion
because the Trial Court in this case expressly granted
leave to the plaintiffs to amend, and the plaintiffs, by
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their counsel, refu.sed to amend and elected to stand
upon their complaint. This amounted to a submission to
judgment on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs and for
the purposes of the demurrer admitted by the defendant.
Gammon Ys. Bunnell, 22 Utah, 421; 64 Pac. 958
(1900).
In this case the Utah Supreme Court held that when
the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the court
below sustaining a judgment, then unless the defendant
whose demurrer had been sustained in the District Court
but overruled in the Supreme Court withdrew his demurer, the judgment should be ordered in favor of the
plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint. On rehearing
the defendant having presented an answer on the merits
showing a meritorious defense, this Court in the exercise
of its discretion permitted the defendant to file its answer
to the complaint on ''such terms as may be just.''
In Stewart vs. Douglass, 148 Cal. 511 ; 83 Pac. 699
(1906), the S~preme Court of California held:
''When a demurrer is sustained to a complaint, it is within the discretion of the court either
to allow an amended complaint to be filed, or to
give judgment forthwith in favor of the defendant.
The appellate court will in every such case sustain
the action of the court below, whatever course it
may take, unless it is made to appear by the record
that there has been an abuse of discretion.''
And again:
''The right to amend after the filing of a
demurrer is absolute only when it is exercised
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before the demurrer is argued and submitted to
the court for decision."
Section 104-14-3 among other things provides for the
amendment of any pleading once by a party as of course
before the time for pleading to it has expired, or after
demurrer and before the trial of the issue of law thereon. A refusal of leave to amend cannot be held to be an
abuse of discretion where there is nothing in the record
to show that the plaintiff asked leave to amend in any
designated particular or in any way specify the nature
of any proposed amendment.
Marsh vs. Lott, 156 Cal. 643; 105 Pac. 968 (1910).
In the case of Marsh vs. Lott, supra, the demurrer
of the defendant to the complaint was based upon several
counts, among which was that the plaintiff was guilty of
laches. As a matter of fact, a prior suit had been brought
by plaintiff against defendant, but the fact of such effort
on the part of the plaintiff was not alleged in the complaint. If this fact had been alleged the plaintiff would
have avoided the bar of laches, but he might have shown
himself estopped by the judgment entered in the former
case. In the Supreme Court of California on appeal,
the plaintiff contended that such court should take judicial notice of the prior action brought by plaintiff against
the defendant, but the Supreme Court held that it knew
of no rule warranting such judicial notice, and the Supreme Court then said:
''As to the refusal to allow plaintiff to amend
his amended complaint, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that he asked leave in the superior court to amend in any designated particu-
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lar, or in any way specified therein the nature
of any proposed amendment. We do not see how,
under such circumstances, we could hold that the
superior court abused its discretion.'' (Citing
Kleinclaus vs. Dutard, 147 Cal. 252, 81 Pac. 516,
and cases cited therein.)
An interesting case is that of Bailey vs. Holden, 50
Vt. 14 (1877). In the Bailey case the defendants demurred for want of equity. That demurrer was overruled.
The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Vermont where ruling was affirmed. It is best to quote
its language :
''Upon the opinion being read and the decision announced, counsel for the defendants asked
leave to withdraw the demurrer, and to be permitted to make answer, and defend on the facts
on reasonable terms. This would require that
the decree should be reversed, and the cause
remanded, to be proceeded with de novo. The application was denied. It was deemed unjust to
the orator to subject him to the protraction of the
litigation, after it had gone to the final decision
in the Supreme Court, upon such defense as the
defendants elected to make, and upon their appeal from a decree against them in the Court of
Chancery. It was their right, in accordance with
rule and usage, in an answer as to matters of fact,
to have traversed the sufficiency of law of the
facts alleged in the bill, as by demurrer, and to
the same effect. Having chosen to rest their
defense upon the facts confessed by the demurrer,
and carried the experiment to the last extremity,
it was regarded unwarrantable to allow the litigation and the decision upon it to go for nothing, and
permit the cause to be put back as it was upon the
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filing of the bill, when the only reason assigned
for it, was, that 'defendants' solicitors had erred
in their judgment of the law.' " (Italics inserted.)
Billesbach vs. Larkey, 161 Cal. 649; 120 Pac. 31
(1911).
In this case a demurrer to the third amended complaint was sustained. Leave to amend further was refused and judgment was rendered. The Supreme Court
held that the refusal to amend was not an abuse of discretion. In the course of its opinion the Court said:
''There were, however, several other causes
of demurrer assigned. If we find the ruling justifiable on any of the other grounds the judgment
must be affirmed. We cannot take notice of the
supposed reasons of the court below and we are
not confined to those reasons in considering the
rights of the parties upon the appeal."
This case held that the judgment for the defendant
should be affirmed if the appellate court could sustain
a demurrer to the complaint upon any of the grounds of
demurrer, whether on the particular ground stated by
the trial court or not, and this holding in this Larkey
case is in accord with that of Burke vs. Maguire, 154
Cal. 456; 98 Pac. 21 (1908). In this Burke case it appeared that the demurrer of the defendant had been
sustained and judgment entered. Quoting from the
opinion of 1\Ir. Justice Shaw:
"It is claimed that the order cannot be affirmed unless this court agrees with the lower
court in the opinion referred to in the order. We
do not so understand the law. If the complaint
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is insufficient upon any ground properly specified
in the demurrer, the order must be sustained,
although the lower court may have considered it
sufficient in that respect, and may in its order
have declared it defective only in some particular
in which we hold it to be good. The defendant is
entitled to the decision of this court on all questions presented by the demurrer and necessary
to the decision made." (Citing authorities.)
The demurrer in the case at bar is general and avers
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant. The Trial Court sustained
that demurrer, and this Court has held that the Trial
Court committed no error in sustaining the demurrer of
this defendant. The appellants, the plaintiffs, appealed
to this Court. They did not allege or assign any error
on the part of the Trial Court relative to the matter of
amending their complaint, because that question never
came up in the Trial Court. It could not come up because the Trial Court did not deny the plaintiffs' right
to amend their complaint; on the contrary, the Trial
Court held the demurrer under advisement from the 4th
day of April until the 6th day of May, 1940, and when
he sustained the demurrer on that last named day, in
his order the Trial Court allowed the plaintiffs ten days
within which to amend. Notice was given of this order
on May 6, 1940, and then on the 17th day of May, 1940,
after the plaintiffs had had ten full days' notice, the
plaintiffs, by their attorneys, declined this right to amend,
and failed and refused to plead further.
What could the Trial Court do but enter a judgment
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for the defendant~ The Trial Court took the only course
that could have been taken and entered such judgment.
The plaintiffs appealed to this court. They made, served
and filed their assignments of error, consisting of three
in number, and the only complaint that is made in those
as~ignments is that the Trial Court erred is sustaining
the defendant's demurrer, and erred in dismissing the
plaintiffs' complaint and in rendering judgment for the
defendant. There is not one word that could be construed
into a complaint relative to any denial of an opportunity
for amending the complaint. The appellants did not
assign any error committed by the Trial Court relative
to an amendment of the complaint, because the Trial
Court did not commit any error. Even in this court
the appellants have not claimed any right as yet to amend
their complaint.
It has been held that the error of a trial court, if
one is made, must be pointed out in this court by assignment, and that assignments not argued will be deemed
waived, and that assigning a wrong reason for a correct
rule is a harmless error, and that the only questions
before an appellate court on appeal are those raised by
assignments of error and presented in appellant's brief.
First National Bank vs. Brown, 20 Utah, 85; 57 Pac.
877 (1899).
Advance Rumley-Thresher Co. vs. Stohl, 75 Utah,
124; 283 Pac. 731 (1929).
In this Stohl case the lower court had refused to
admit evidence to support one of the defenses alleged
by the defendant, and of this matter this Court unanimously said:
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''We are now asked to determine the question
whether in the event of reversal the defendant
may not urge this defense. This we may not do.
The question was not presented by any assignment
of error, nor is it discussed in the briefs."
Cornia vs. Cornia, 80 Utah, 486; 15 Pac. (2d) 631
(1932).
In this case this Court dismissed an appeal because
there had been a failttre to serve or file in this court
assignments of error within the time prescribed by court
rule. This court will not search the record for error, and
reasons, even when given by a trial court, are after
all immaterial in this court if the ruling of the trial
court is correct.
Liberty Coal Co. vs. Snow, 53 Utah, 298; 178 Pac.
341 (1919).
In this Snow case Mr. Justice Frick said:
"That the district court, in its rulings at the
trial, may not have-followed all of the foregoing
reasons, and may have indulged in others, is
wholly immaterial. In view of the conceded facts
the only question here is whether the judgment is
right as a matter of law.''
A party cannot complain that leave to amend was
not granted when he did not ask for it.
Adeline Mfg. Co. vs. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162; 76
N. W. 371; 42 L. R. A. 531 (1898).
In this Michigan case it was held that the complainant
should have been given an opportunity to amend his
bill if he desired it, but the Court said:
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"We cannot assume that he did, and the record does not show that he asked for it, so far as
we are advised.''
(In the case at bar the record affirmatively shows
that the plaintiffs declined the right to amend given by
the Court.)
This is an action at law, not a suit in equity. The
jurisdiction of this Court is exclusively appellate in such
a case. (Section 4, Art. VIII, Utah State Constitution.)
"In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the
appeal shall be on question of law alone." (Sec.
9, Art. VIII, Utah State Constitution.)
The right to amend was one to be determined by the
District Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion.
The District Court determined and granted that right
to amend in the case at bar, and the plaintiffs refused and
declined that right. Even if the District Court had abused
its discretion and denied that right, this Court has no
power to review that ruling unless its appellate power is
invoked by the appellant. That power has not been invoked. There is no assignment of error and there could
not be because the District Court allowed the plaintiffs
a right to amend.
Even the District Court could not have granted the
plaintiffs relief from their deliberate act had the District
Court been petitioned to exercise such power.
Section 104-14-4 of the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, grants a broad discretion to a district court in
granting relief in furtherance of justice. This section
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of the statute grants the broadest discretionary powers
to the district court, but they are discretionary with that
court, and there is a time limit withing which that court
may exercise such discretionary powers. If there is no
time, where will litigation end 1

"It is a question of power."
L. Ed. 797 ( 1881).

(104 U. S. 410; 26

In the first portion of the section power is granted
to allow amendments to pleading·s and proceedings ; for
the correction of mistakes and for the enlargement of
time, and for the filing of pleadings and motions after
the time limited by the code has expired. It then provides:
''and may also, upon such terms as may be just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from
a judgment, order or other proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; and when, for any
reason satisfactory to the court or the judge thereof, the party aggrieved has failed to apply for
a new trial or other relief sought during the term
at which such judgment, order or proceeding complained of was taken, the court, or judge thereof
in vacation, may grant the relief upon application
made within a reasonable time, not exceeding
ninety days after the making or occurrence of the
judgment, order or other proceeding sought to be
relieved from. But in no event can a motion for
new trial be made after the time for appeal has
passed." Section 104-14-4. (See Amd. 1939.
Chapter 121.)
Then follows a provision providing that nothing
but the actual taxable costs of the action accruing on and
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after the default shall be imposed by the court under
the provisions of this section authorizing the imposition
of terms as a condition upon which relief is granted.
Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah, 235; 81 Pac. 860
(1905).
In this case neither the defendant nor his attorney
apeared at the trial. The case was tried in their absence and a verdict of $2500 was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict on June 3, 1904. On
October 31, 1904, within the time for appeal as then
provided, the defendant served and filed a motion to
vacate the verdict and all proceedings subsequent thereto
upon the ground that the same was taken against him
through his mistake and excusable neglect. Relief in
furtherance of justice was sought under the statute then
known as Section 3005 of the Revised Statutes of 1898.
That section is now, with no amendment material here,
Section 104-14-4 of the Revised Statutes of 1933.
Sec. 104-14-4, Chapter 121, Laws 1939.
Bronson vs. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410; 26 L. Ed. 797
(1881).
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McCarty,
said:
''In order to bring a case within the foregoing
provision of the statute, the moving party must
show that he has used due diligence to prepare
and appear for trial, and present his defense, and
that he was prevented from doing so because of
some accident, misfortune, or combination of circumstances over which he had no control. If, how-
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ever, the 'record discloses mere carelessness, lack
of attention, or indifference to his rights on the
part of applicant or his counsel, he cannot expect
an opportunity to redeem the past. If the party's
negligence is without excuse or justification, he
must abide the consequences.' '' (Citing authorities.)
In the case at bar there was no negligence on the part
of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. They were present,
and in the language of the judgment they failed and refused to amend ~heir complaint, and the judgment is
analogous to one as entered upon default.
''The pleader is not required to amend but
may stand on his pleading and suffer judgment.''
Ellis Co. vs. Brannen, 161 Ala. 573; 49 So. 1034
(1909).
On appeal he has a right to claim that the ruling
in sustaining the demurrer was erroneous, but surely
he has no right to claim an error on the part of the trial
court for not allowing him to amend when the trial court
did allow him to amend and he refused to amend. Then
again, we are confronted with the rule of law briefly
stated as: ''Right Ruling for Wrong Reason.''
''A right ruling will be sustained though
based on a wrong reason.''
Liberty Coal Co. vs. Snow, 53 Utah, 298; 178 Pac.
341 ( 1919) supra.
Jeffries vs. Fraternal Society, 135 Iowa, 284; 112
N. W. 786 supra.
Billesbach vs. Larkey, 161 Cal. 649; 120 Pac. 31
( 1911) supra.
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Burke vs. Maguire, 154 Cal. 456; 98 Pac. 21 (1908)
supra.
Fields vs. Kincaid, 67 Colo. 20; 184 Pac. 832 (1919).
Board vs. First State Bank, 77 Okla. 291 ; 188 Pac.
115 (1920).
Perkins vs. Peterson, 67 Colo. 101; 185 Pac. 660
(1919).
Dunkin vs. Galloway, 75 Okla. 125; 181 Pac. 939
(1919).
Babcock vs. Engel, 58 Mont. 597; 194 Pac. 137
(1920).
Ex Parte Hunter (Cal.) 195 Pac. 75 (1921).
British-American Ins. Co. vs. Wilson, 77 Conn. 559;
60 Atl. 293 ( 1905).
Lewiston vs. Stoddard, 78 Conn. 575; 63 Atl. 621
(1906).
As late as 1920 it was held by this court that '' although the court may believe a decree to be erroneous
in a particular matter, it has no alternative but to affirm
the decree where such matter is not presented for review."
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. vs. Shurtliffe,
56 Utah 196, 189 Pac. 587 (Pages 591, 593)
(1920).
Up until the announcement of the decision in this
case it has been generally supposed by the bench and
the bar, by lawyers of long and short experience, that
when a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint has been
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sustained, and when the plaintiff has been granted the
right to amend and when that plaintiff has refused to
exercise that right, the burden was upon the plaintiff
for the result of any mistake that such party or the
counsel might make in declining to amend. Competent
lawyers often have taken leave to amend their complaint
for no other purpose than to check over the facts with
the allegations contained in the complaint.
As was at one time said by Justice Lamm of the
Supreme Court of Missouri: (10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 145)
''The formulation of legal principles is not
for a day or for one case. Such principles are for
general use in like cases until overthrown.''
Shall the rule of practice established under Utah's
Code of Civil Procedure since that code first came into
being be at this time and in this case destroyed and annulled 1 Shall civil procedure be made more uncertain~
Shall the law as it exists in every state from Connecticut to California and from Florida to Montana be disregarded 1 Shall this Court take jurisdiction to determine a question that is not before the Court for
review? THERE MUST BE ERROR TO JUSTIFY
REVERSAL OF A JUDGMENT.
Sutter vs. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 112 (1868).
"When a demurrer to a complaint is properly
sustained, with leave to amend, and the plaintiff
declines to do so, the judgment will not be reversed
on appeal in order to allow an amendment.
THERE MUST BE ERROR TO JUSTIFY A
REVERSAL OF A JUDGMENT." (Par. 3 of
syllabi.) (Caps ours.)
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Quotation from opinion:
''The appellant, however, asks that the case
be sent back, with leave to amend. But this we
cannot do. The Court granted leave to amend,
so he had the opportunity, but declined to embrace
it. He chose to stake his case upon the demurrer,
and final judgment was accordingly entered upon
it. The appeal is from the judgment, and we find
no error to vitiate it. We hold that the Court
committed no error, so far as the record shows
its action, and that the judgment is in all respects
legal. We cannot, therefore, reverse it, for we
find no error to justify such action, and plaintiff
cannot now amend, because there is a valid final
judgment; and there is nothing more to be done,
without first reversing this judgment. It would
be an anomaly in legal proceedings to hold the
judgment in all respects correct, and then arbitrarily reverse it." (Italics ours.)
Kirby vs. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 404; 10 Pac. 119
(1886).
Lower Court prohibited from allowing amendment
to complaint after affirmance of judgment by Supreme
Court.
Quotation from opinion:
''The judgment of this court on appeal has
determined that there was no error in the record,
and the parties and court a qua are alike concluded
by it from vacating it and making another case
for trial. The plaintiff should not be thus allowed
to speculate or gamble on remedies." Italics ours.
But the plaintiffs in this case and their counsel made
no mistake in declining to amend. The unalterable
facts of record are such that the plaintiffs cannot truth-
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fully allege that the award of compensation has been paid
by the insurance carrier. This will explain why that allegation was not put in the complaint and why counsel
for plaintiffs de&ned to amend when that right was
given by the Trial Court.
There has been attached to this petition and brief
Exhibit A, a certified copy of the award of compensation
made by the Industrial Commission of this state.
CONTENTION NO. 6
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL
This Court has held that complaint is insufficient as
against demurrer of defendant, and yet reversed judgment (Ex Gratia). Allegation that award of compensation has been paid was omitted from the complaint either
by accident or design. It it was an accident it was due
to the negligence of appellants here, plaintiffs below. If
truth required the omission, as it appears to have done,
then no one is at fault, and the Trial Court will be compelled to once again enter judgment for defendant. Respondent should have costs in any event.
Chaswell vs. Delaware, 56 Fed. 529 (9 C. C.
A.; 1893).
Hathaway vs. United Mines Co., 42 Utah, 520;
132 Pac. 388 ( 1913).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the respondent respectfully submits··
that no case can stand alone. This case, when finally decided, must have some effect as a precedent. Having that
effect, it is the more important to rest its decision upon
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sound and well-established principles. The respondent
has based its right for a reconsideration on such principles summarized as follows:
FIRST : Subrogation is not assignment. When Section 42-1-58 provided for subrogation of insurance carrier, that section by so providing did not make rights of
action to recover for injury or death assignable; it did
not even transfer the right of action for death from dependents to insurance carrier. On the contrary, insurance carrier obtained this right when it had paid the
compensation awarded directly from the statute. The
result follows that no one can sustain the contention that
Section 42-1-58 made any right of action assignable. Assignability is not affected by Section 42-1-58. Survivability is still the sole test of assignability.
SECOND: Insurance carrier as subrogee under Section 42-1-58 acquired no property right; no right capable
of inheritance; no right that was capable of assignment.
THIRD: Plaintiffs in their complaint are not seeking
to enforce a property right, but rather are seeking to
enforce what they allege is their own right to recover
damages for wrongful death. They by means of an alleged "waiver and assignment" are seeking to revoke and
nullify the election which they made to take compensation.
FOURTH: Insurance carrier could not have become
• vested with the right of action to recover damages
from the third person until that insurance carrier had
paid the award in full. Carrier has not paid and could not
pay that award in full because of its express terms. There-
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fore, the insurance carrier could not assign the right
which it did not own. Assignment of a non-existent action is void.
FIFTH: Long and well-established rules of law of a
jurisdictional nature preclude this Court from allowing
plaintiffs to amend their complaint; even the District
Court has no such power after judgment when 90 days
time has expired (Section 104-14-4) (Chapter 121, Laws
1939). This is true where a most meritorious showing
o~ mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is
made. The reversal of this judgment is contrary to law
because no error of any sort can be found in that judgment. A reversal cannot be granted in this case because
the Trial Court did not commit any error. In the language of Justice Frick, ''the only question here is whether
the judgment is right as a matter of law." (53 Utah,
298.) No error committed nor error assigned.
SIXTH: There was no fault committed by counsel
for either party either in refusing to amend or in precluding the exercise of that right given by the Trial
Court. It is an absolute certainty that respondent was
not at fault either as a matter of law or of ethics. Why
should it pay costs of appeal, but why should judgment be
reversed?
For the reasons herein stated it is submitted that
the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

.._

MARLON E. WILSON,
ROBERT C. WILSON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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EXHIBIT A
CERTIFIED COPY OF COMPENSATION
AWARD
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH
CLAIM NO. 4005
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA
JOHANSON, father and mother
respectively of Robert Johanson,
deceased, Janet Orem, Blaine
Orem and Emma Alveretta
Johanson,
Applicants,
vs.
ROYAL CRYSTAL SALT COMPANY, and/or LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO.,
Defendants.

DECISION

In conformity with notice and order of the Industrial Commission of Utah, this matter was duly heard
on August 8, 1938 at Tooele City, Utah, the applicants
being present and represented by their attorney, Mr.
E. LeRoy Shields; Robert A. Burns, Esquire, appearing
for the defendants. Sworn testimony was presented
and certain stipulations agreed to by the respective parties.
The Commission being advised in the premises,
makes the following Findings, Conclusions and Orders:
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FINDINGS
On the 3rd day of June, 1938 Robert Johanson, while
employed as truck driver, in the course of his regular
duties, by the defendant Royal Crystal Salt Company,
suffered accidental injury resulting in his immediate
death, to-wit: "Was backing truck into loading platform at the Cudahy Packing Company's plant at North
Salt Lake, contacted electric current and was electrocuted.
II
On the above date, the defendant Royal Crystal
Salt Company was an employer subject to the State Industrial Act, the London Guarantee & Accident Company being its insurance carrier. The wage earned by
Robert Johanson on the date of his fatal injury was
$5.40 per day, the operation of the Royal Crystal Salt
Company's plant being 5 days per week.
III
On the date of his fatal injury, Robert Johanson
was one of several children living with his parents, the
applicants herein (Carl and Clara Johanson). He was
contributing in part to their maintenance and support,
said parents being in fact partially dependent upon the
decedent Robert Johanson at the time of his injury and
death, to the extent and degree of $7.79 per week.

IV
The Commission finds that applicants Janet Orem,
Blaine Orem and Emma Alvaretta Johanson were not
dependent, in whole or in part, upon the decedent Robert
Johanson at the time of his fatal injury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

98

v
The applicants were represented before the Commission by Mr. E. Le Roy Shields, Attorney at Law,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and the reasonable value of such
services are $25.00.
CONCLUSIONS
In view of the foregoing Findings, the Commission
concludes that Robert Johanson was killed by reason of
an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, while employed by the Royal Crystal Salt
Company, and that therefore, the defendants herein
should be required to pay compensation to the dependants of said deceased, together with burial expense, as
provided by law.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the Royal
Crystal Salt Company and/ or London Guarantee and Accident Company pay to the applicants, Carl J olifison and
Clara Johanson, of Grantsville, Utah, compensation at
the rate of $7.79 per week for a period of six years after
the date of fatal injury, payments to begin as of June 4,
1938, all accrued payments to be paid in a lump sum and
thereafter once each four weeks, unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the defendants
herein pay direct to Mr. E. LeRoy Shields, Attorney at
Law, 905 First National Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, the sum of $25.00, deducting said sum from the
compensation herein awarded to the applicants.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the defendants
herein pay for the burial of decedent, Robert Johanson,
as provided by law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that in case any
party hereto desires to be further heard in these proceedings or to appeal from this Decision, written application
for rehearing herein must be filed with the Industrial
Commission of Utah within thirty (30) days from the
date of mailing a copy of this Decision to said parties, as
said date is evidenced by letter of transmittal of the same
as shown by the records or files in the office of this Commission.
The Industrial Commission of Utah retains jurisdiction over this case until all proceedings are had and
all matters and things done herein to finally dispose of
the same according to law.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UTAH,
WM. M. KNEER,
0. F. McSHANE,
B. D. NEBEKER,
Commissioners.

OF

I hereby certify the above to be a true and correct
copy of decision rendered by The Industrial Commis-

sion of Utah on the 22nd day of August, 1938.
CAROLYN D. SMITH,
Secretary.
(SEAL)

Industrial Commission of Utah.
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